# Round 2 – Aff v MSU HR

## 1ac

### Revelatory Knowledge 1AC

#### Alex “Little Soldier” Lunderman was a Rosebund Sioux Lakota, who led his tribe, the Sicangu Iyate. His successor, Ronald Neiss, explains his vision to us in 2002

[Ronald L. Neiss, Chieftain of the Rosebud Land of the Lakota in South Dakota, on January 1st, 2002]

Rosebud Sioux Tribe Utility Commission upon the passing of our previous president Alex "Little Soldier" Lunderman into the Spirit World.   Alex was also a tribal president and vice president. He fully supported the Tribe's gathering of wind data in 1995 and the Rosebud/DOE Wind Demonstration Project, which is scheduled for completion by this summer (2002).  Wind development was a part of his vision for the Sicangu Oyate (Burnt Thigh Lakota People) on the Rosebud Indian Reservation. He believed we could use modern technology as well as our resources in a way that is compatible with our history, our philosophy, and our cultural and spiritual values. In a vision, he saw a long line of people behind him walking toward a traditional tipi. Inside the tipi were computers and other kinds of technologies that could be used by our people to protect our Mother Earth. He later told us that being able to generate clean electricity from the Four Winds could help our people. With the Rosebud Wind Project, we are trying to make his vision a reality by using the tremendous wind resource on the reservation in a good way. The wind is always blowing on the Rosebud Reservation.  An elder from a southwest Pueblo once said to me, "Say, all your animals up here kind of lean over to one side. Do they fall over when the wind stops?" I answered, "We don't know... it never stops blowing."

#### Visions are a form of revelatory knowledge, knowledge which can be intuited from non-scientific origins – these visions open up space for new personal and political possibilities

Vine Deloria, Jr. retired professor emeritus of history at the University of Colorado. 1999. For This Land. Pg. 250-260

Revelatory experiences are another thing altogether. They tell us things we cannot possibly know in any other way. Moses approaches the burning bush, is told that it is a holy place, learns the name of God, and is given a vocational task to perform on behalf of his community. With this information come directions through which a new future is possible. k a holy place always involves the manifestation of a per­sonal spirit of immense and unmeasured power, a real spirit of place with which our species must have communion thereafter. Holy places exist in all countries and form the sacred configuration of the land. These places speak of the ultimate holiness of creation. They give a meaningful context to the reflective locations. This distinction between reflective and revelatory places is not intended to downgrade the validity of reflective experiences of lands. It is the ability to reflect that creates the awareness and sensitivity of peoples to the qualitative intensity of revelatory places. But the distinction is necessary because revelatory places are known only through the experience of prolonged occupation of land, and they cannot be set aside because of the aesthetic or emotional appeal of particular places. The most common experience of Indian tribes today is that of reflective places. One must suspect that common knowledge of lands among Indians always featured a high percentage of reflective places through­out Indian occupation of this continent. ‘ilibal histories, for the most part, are land-centered. That is to say, every feature of a landscape has stories attached to it. If a tribal group is very large or has lived on a particular piece of land for many generations, some natural features will have many stories attached to them. I know some places in the Dakotas about which at least a dozen stories are told. These stories relate both secular events such as tales of hunting and warfare and sacred events such as personal or tribal religious experiences. Each family within a tribe has its own tradition of stories about tribal ancestral lands. In theory it would be possible to gather from the people of the tribe all the stories that relate to every feature of the landscape. If these stories were then arranged chronologically, the result would be a history of the people somewhat similar to what whites mean by history. But the history would be considered artificial by most Indians because the intensity of the original experience—which was a function of the place and important in explaining the incident or event—would have been abandoned in favor of the chronology.

#### Revelatory knowledge fosters physis. This connection is the starting point of our epistemology: it infuses both politics and a metaphysically impotent educational system with creativity and compromise

**Allen 10** [Dyami Allen, born on Diné reservation, B.A. Evergreen State, studied philosophy at NYU, Talking Stick Native Arts Quarterly, Issue 13.3, Jul/Aug/Sep 2010, “Ways of Thinking”]

Philosophy endeavors to create meaning out of lived experiences and to uphold the idea that "A philosopher is a ~~man~~ who never ceases to experience, see, hear, suspect, hope, and dream extraordinary things" (Frederick Nietzsche). The nature and scope of the search for meaning are bounded, apriori, in the cultural context in which these terms are explored. In her essay, On Authenticity, Dine philosopher Marilyn Notah Verney asks three questions about Native American Philosophy: What is it? How can outsiders study it? How can it contribute to traditional academic philosophy? These three questions have informed my academic work and my personal experiences.¶ Western philosophy tends to take apart, taking apart what is to distinguish what is, from what is not. By this we tend to lose meaning by losing relation with all surrounding things. The difference between the western philosophy and Native metaphysical and ontological ideas are that Natives have an innate reverence to the land. Physis, as Heidegger states, is a Greek word meaning nature. It is this physis the west has lost touch with. In order to understand Diné it is imperative to understand physis.¶ Verney explains that in order to understand the differences one needs to look at the relation Diné have with the earth. One noticeable difference is how physis is not to be taken and owned. Earth is a living being to be respected as the mother. The mother who gives life, the mother who rejuvenates, the mother that disciplines its children by its unpredictable weather. We come from the earth, from she who fed us in the same way we are fed as babies at our mothers' breast.¶ Traditionally, Native Americans related to the natural world philosophically; that is, our philosophy is about relationships between person and nature. Verney states, "if non-Natives can understand our traditional spiritual relationship with the land and its connection within the universe, that all things have life, then one can better understand our people, our culture, and our traditional beliefs". We know that to fully grasp a particular culture, it's important to know that creation stories reveal much about a culture's metaphysics. In the context of creation stories, most Native Americans believe in a starting point, and, in most cases, that starting point is mother earth.¶ Diné belief starts with animals and spiritual beings developing in the womb of the great mother. The creation legend of the Diné includes an account of the three worlds. The great flood forced animals and spiritual beings to climb through a hollow reed to the surface of the Mother Earth to escape the rising water. To the dismay of the inhabitants of the surface world, the water did not subside. Knowing coyote and his mischievous ways, the spiritual beings First Man and First Woman confronted coyote – because they knew that coyote wonders about things, and how they really work. First Man and First Woman found that coyote had taken two of the water monster's babies. Coyote was instructed to return the water monster's babies. Soon after the water began to recede, revealing the surface of Mother Earth.¶ Our oral tradition has formed our philosophical metaphysics, and by stories like this that teach us the way of being. The things around us, in our experience and the things to which we are most directly related are our teachers. It is this respect that sustains our life. Verney states, "Everything that sustains life is within our reach, for we sustain and are sustained by life, which is given to us by our Mother. Therefore, our universe and land are sacred, holy, and to be treated with respect. "¶ The base of metaphysics is developed by respect, "the metaphysics of respect." As one would prostrate himself or herself before a god in obedience, so the Diné show common kindness and caring towards Physis. By this we find our place in the universe. As Diné have co-existed with colonizers, new concepts and abstractions have flowed into the picture. These abstractions make our commitment to physis, to nature, more real and urgent. However we struggle to describe the universe without reference to western concepts of time or space – Our philosophy, our metaphysics, requires a language that is not represented in European/American traditions. In the end, these western philosophical traditions are impoverished as they lack adequate terms for our experience of everything from creation to the seasons.¶ In fact, western philosophy considers Native practices and beliefs – our metaphysics – to be animistic or vitalistic. These colonial philosophers characterize us as primitive and thus avoid developing a language for representing those transcendental unifications of experience and those intuitions of things unseen, but felt by consciousness – the deeply felt experiences of Diné.¶ The world as we know it has been put in John Locke's idea, "where there is no property there is no injustice". Property has become the focus of our society, "the reason why men enter into society is the preservation of their property," and ownership of the land in turn results in the loss of a relationship and intimacy with nature.¶ Native American thought has been in consistent confrontation with Euro/Am philosophy, a philosophy steeped in its politics, economics, and religion. Not much room for compromise, only a foundation that must be upheld at any expense. The way in which young Natives are raised – in public schools, on reservations, in boarding schools – alienates us from nature and thus from our metaphysical roots. Their schooling white washes our traditions and denies the fact that we come from a tradition where all of us are philosophers, all of us are Diné.¶ Martin Heidegger along with Friedrich Nietzsche are but a few European philosophers who hold analogous views to Diné. Heidegger's Dasein reveals how an individual can perceive it:¶ Many things which we designate as seined, and we do so in various sense. Everything we talk about, everything we have in view, everything towards which we comport ourselves in any way, is being; what we are is being, and so is how we are. Being lies in the fact that something is, and in its Being as it is; in Reality; in presence-at-hand; in subsistence; in validity; in Dasein; in the "there is."¶ To know and/or relate to Diné it is important to know Being, revealing true self, a re-emergence to authenticity. "Dasein is in each case essentially its own possibility; it can, in its very Being, choose itself and win itself. It can also lose itself and never win itself; or only seem to do so" It is important to know the difference between Being and otherness, Heidegger explains:¶ In one's concern with what one has taken hold of, whether with, for, or against, the Other, there is constant care as to the way one differs from them, whether that difference is merely one that is to be evened out, whether one's own Dasein has lagged behind the Others and wants to catch up in relationship to them, or whether one's Dasein already has some priority over them and sets out to keep them suppressed. The care about this distance between them is disturbing to Bing-with-one-another, though this disturbance is one that is hidden from it."¶ Verney asks, "do American Indians have to continue to follow a philosophy of the 'Other?'" Is the "Other" forgetting the ways of its Diné (authentic)? Heidegger proceeds:¶ This Being-with-one-another dissolves one's own Dasein completely into the kind of Being of "the Other," in such a way, indeed, that the Others, as distinguishable and explicit, vanish more and more. In this inconspicuousness and unascertainable, the real dictatorship of the “they" is unfolded. We take pleasure and enjoy ourselves as they take pleasure; we read, see, and judge about literature, and art as they see and judge; likewise we shrink back from the 'great mass' as they shrink back; we find 'shocking' what they find shocking. The 'they,' which is nothing definite, and which all are, though not as the sum, prescribe the kind of Being of everydayness.

#### We are all philosophers: Recognizing the creative value of transcendent political potentials infuses education with creativity and value

**Read 55** (Herbert, Education through Art: A Revolutionary Policy Source: Art Education, Vol. 8, No. 7 (Nov., 1955)

We might begin, perhaps, by establishing a necessary connection between the present kind of education and the present state of the world. Negatively, of course, nothing could be simpler than to point out that education has done **nothing** to improve the moral condition of humanity. **It has not prevented wars**-**it has made them easier to conduct**. It has not prevented crime-it has made criminals cleverer than they used to be. It has done nothing to make people better or even happier; it has merely given them various forms of distraction or amusement that make them forget their misery for a moment. The citizen who is educated enough to solve a crossword puzzle is not happier than the illiter-ate ploughman who whistles as he works: he merely has a more complicated mechanism to en-able him to escape from his worries. One could elaborate at great length this nega-tive aspect of intellectual education-its immense futility, its moral inadequacy. It is, however, far more important to stress the positive effects of the system. Man is born an individual but finds as he grows up that he is a member of a group -of groups within groups: the family, the com-munity, society as a whole. In this single fact lies all his happiness and unhappiness. A group is more than a collection of individuals. It is an entity with its own instincts-herd instincts, as we call them,-and these group instincts can so dominate the individual that he loses all identity, all distinctiveness-he thinks, feels and acts as an undifferentiated element of the group. To a certain extent some degree of this group soli-darity has been forced on mankind by the struggle for existence-for existence as a species among other species. But afterwards human solidarity degenerated into herd solidarity, and groups of men began to fight each other for a "place in the sun". I will not stop to discuss whether this was inevitable, or desirable for the sake of progress: the fact I want to stress is that in the process it became natural for ~~man~~ to sur-render ~~his~~ individuality to the group**.** ~~He~~ ceased to be a ~~man~~ and became a citizen, and as Rousseau said, you cannot be both at the same time. Education in its widest sense, has been the process of turning a ~~man~~ into a citizen. But education has never succeeded in this aim, or never succeeded for long. This is shown in the fact that ~~man~~ has never remained satisfied with any particular kind of citizenship. Monarchy, oligarchy, democracy, state socialism, commun-ism-man changes from one to the other be-cause he can never accommodate his individual-ism to any of them. He cannot do this because the source of vitality is in the individual and not in the group. Individuals are differentiated-that is to say, they are variously endowed. One man is a genius, another is an idiot, and there are a thousand degrees of sensibility and intel-ligence between these extremes. Spiritual and intellectual growth is a result of the interaction of these unstable psychic elements-the condi-tion of challenge and response, to use Toynbee's phrase, inherent in such a situation. But the group cannot tolerate this internal anarchy. Slowly, silently, imperceptibly, it strives to iron out these creases, to level out the differences between individuals, to produce the uniform coherent mass. **Education** is the instrument of this subtle coercion; **convention** is the result. We are taught to admire the solidarity of the state, the unity of the nation, the esprit de corps of an army, but "our admiration of great organi-zations", as Jung says, "dwindles when once we become aware of the other side of the wonder: the tremendous piling up and accentuation of all that is primitive in man, and the unavoidable destruction **of ~~his~~ individuality** in the interests of the monstrosity that every great organization in fact is. The ~~man~~ of today, who resembles more or less the collective ideal, has made ~~his~~ heart into a **den of murderers**, as can easily be proved by the analysis of his unconscious, even though he himself is not in the least disturbed by it". (Collected Works, VII, s. 240). I shall ¶ illustrate this state of mind from topical events. Two weeks ago a writer in the NEW STATESMANp ointed with irony to the fact that at the very moment a section of the public was protesting against the televised version of Orwell's 1984, which it found too horrible, their representatives on the NATO council in Paris were debating without let or hindrance whether **the button that would release the horrors of an atomic war should be pushed by a general or a politician**. The unreal schizophrenic life we lead could not be more aptly summarized. We are **indifferent** to the realities that **may destroy us**: we protest against the fictions that remind us of these realities. **We live in a world of illusions**-1We have come through the terrors of a modern war, and ten years after have forgotten them-forgotten the dead, forgotten the bombs, forgotten Belsen and Auschwitz. We have football and cricket, rac-ing and dancing, radio and television-enough to occupy our leisure hours, enough to numb our nagging consciences. The rest is sleep. This deep dichotomy is, I think, something rela-tively new in human society. We have refused to recognize the totality of modern war-the fact that it is a catastrophe that involves every man, woman and child. Before 1914 war was a pro-fessional job, conducted by paid specialists on some chosen ground. There might be incidental phases of a war, such as the siege of Paris in 1870, that involved civilians: isolated areas might be ravaged and laid waste by armies that did not obey the rules. But the main object was always to defeat an enemy, represented by an army, not to destroy a people. To slaughter men, women and children was apt to give a conquerer a bad name. In the past war was accepted as a tragic fact. The literature of the Middle Ages is full of la-ments for the cruelties and disasters of war, and right down to Napoleonic times there is no at-tempt to evade any of the realities of an in- secure existence. The paths of glory lead but to the grave, but equally the short and simple annals of the poor end in the same narrow cell. We think of the 18th century as artificial, but the sentiments expressed in Gray's "Elegy" are bleakly realistic compared with the sentiments of an educated citizen of today. The unimagined horrors of atomic warfare await the pressing of a button, and meanwhile we play, we sleep, we dream. And now comes the final twist to this ironic story. Having banished the real and im-minent horrors of life, having buried our bestiali-ties deep in the unconscious, we let them out in substitute fantasies-in stories of murder and sexual sadism, of wars that take place in space and tortures that are ascribed to sub-human invaders from another planet. Yes, ladies and gentlemen, the horror comics-they too come into the picture. They are as much a part of our collective neurosis as total war and sadistic crime. They too are part of the price we pay for the total war machine, for the conscienceless State, for the docile masses. Docility, apathy, insensibility-these are the achievements of education in our time, and they are achieved by the suppression of individuality, sensitivity, creativity. Social conformity or con-vention demands a general frustration of per-sonal instincts, the surrender to herd instincts, which then carry the individual in the **ebb and flow of their aggressive attitudes**. For **when the individual has been deprived of ~~his~~ creative functions, he is ready to take part in collective destruction**. And then, if ~~he~~ can't have the real thing, which is war, ~~he~~ will indulge in fantasies of cruelty and murder, mass produced for one and all. But some of us protest-we protest against the horror comics, we protest against the television of 1984. I doubt if these two protests are on the same footing. To begin with, 1984 is a work of art-perhaps not a great work of art, but a warning fable conceived with imaginative force and realism. The average horror comic-and I am thinking of the kind to be seen on any American railroad bookstall-is crudely con-ceived and vulgarly presented. It merits condem-nation, not so much for its sadism and horror, as for its ugliness. Give it the artistic form of a medieval crucifixion, or of the evisceration of a martyr as depicted by a Flemish artist, and we begin to see how inconsistent we are in our protests. But I suppose that the people who can-not bear to look at a televised version of 1984 would not care to live with Van Eyck's LAST JUDGMENT. I am not defending horror comics, or horrors however artistic. But so long as the frustration demanded by social convention leads to aggres-sion, so long as creative instincts are turned into destructive instincts by the process we call edu-cation, just so long will ~~man~~ produce sadistic fantasies. I am not forgetting that some of the sadistic fantasies I have mentioned were pro-duced before the modern education system came into existence; but they were contemporary with a religious universalism and fanaticism that had comparable effects. What distinguishes previous ages from our own time is a sense of proportion, a sense of balance. If Van Eyck had painted nothing but scenes of horror, we might suspect that he was only saved from the condemnation we mete out to horror comics by his superior skill; but actually the same artist painted or helped to paint, the Adoration of the Lamb in the Ghent Aktarpiece, which is a celebration of all that is innocent and sublime; he painted the lovely Madonnas now in Berlin, Dresden and Paris, icons of incomparable purity and serenity; he painted the symbolic figure of St. Jerome with a tame lion at his feet, all aggression lost. If a society has such spiritual compensations it can afford to look at cruelty and lust and murder. Unfortunately our society lacks such compensa-tions, and with full consciousness of what I am saying, I say that it is our educational system that is to be blamed. We cannot exist as disparate individuals, each a little kingdom six feet long. We must combine into societies for mutual aid, and with full awareness of what this entails as conscious sac-rifice of individuality, and unconscious acquisi-tion of hatred, we must set about the creation of a compensatory process of integration. Edu-cation should be just that: a reconciliation of the individual in all his uniqueness with society in all its unity-a process that implies a reconcili-ation of the conscious and unconscious aspects of the psyche. **The path of reconciliation is the path of creative activity**, and **in the work of art we have** a symbol of reconciliation, an object into which we **project our unconscious fantasies**, and which then passes into the open market, into free circulation, as a language of symbolic discourse. If we possess this symbolic language, then we can communicate on all levels of the psyche. We no longer suppress our fantasies, no longer deny our individuality its free expansion. We are henceforth members of one another, not only in spirit, but in act: the spirit, the supra-personal psyche, informs the concrete symbols of our individual creation, which then circulate in perfect freedom. If this is the truth-and past history and mod-ern psychology can be brought in overwhelming evidence to prove it-then **our whole educa-tional effort should be concentrated to this pur-pose**; for **what is the use of science and tech-nology, of intellect itself, if they are merely to be the instruments of mass-murder and self-destruction**.

#### Thus: Infuse the vision of Alex Lunderman into discussions of energy policy.

#### We affirm the resolution not as a single idea for a policy action but as a vision of the possibility of new forms of thinking and orienting ourselves towards energy production in the United States. We affirm a reorientation toward the topic that respects the viewpoints of the multitude of Native American nations, and specifically the vision articulated by Alex Lunderman, in favor of the destructive overconsumptive habits endemic to modernity.

#### The distinction between an idea and a vision as well as the fundamental tenets of our approach to liberation are best explained by Vine Deloria Jr in 1999

Vine Deloria Jr 1999 [Theologian, legal scholar, JD, Ph.D, M.Div, standing rock Sioux, For This Land,105-107

An old Indian saying captures the radical difference between Indians and Western peoples quite adequately. The white man, the Indians maintain, has ideas; Indians have visions. Ideas have a single dimension and require a chain of connected ideas to make sense. The connections that are made between ideas can lead to great insights on the nature of things, or they can lead to the inexorable logic of Catch-22 in which the logic ineVitably leads to the polar opposite of the original proposition. The vision, on the other hand, presents a whole picture of experience and has a central meaning that stands on its own feet as an independent revelation. It is said that Albert Einstein could not conceive of his problems in physics in conceptual terms but instead had visions of a whole event. He then spent his time attempting to translate elements of that event that couldbe separated into mathematical and verbal descriptions that could be communicated to others. It is this difference, change from inductive and deductive logic to transformation of perceived realities, that becomes the liberating factor, not additional information or continual replacement of data and concepts within traditional framework ofinterpretation. Let us return, then, to our discussion of the manner in which racial minorities have been perceivedby the white community, particularly by the liberal establishment, in the past decade and a half. Minority groups, conceived to be different from the white majority, are perceived to be lacking some critical element of humanity that, once received, would bring them to some form of equality with the white majority. The trick has been in identifying that missing element, and each new articulation ofgoals is immediately attributed to every minority group and appears to answer the question that has been posed by the sincere but unreflective liberal community. Liberation is simply the manner in which this missing element is presently conceived by people interested in reform. It will become another social movement fad and eventually fade away to be replaced with yet another instant analysis of the situation. Until fundamental questions regarding the assumptions that form the basis for Western civilization are raised and new articulations of reality are discovered, the impulse to grab quickly and apparently easy answers will continue. Social conditions will continue to be described in a cause-and-effect logic that has dominated Western thinking for its entire intellectual lifetime. Programs will be designed that fail to account for the change in conditions that occurs continually in human societies. Ideas will continue **to dominate our concerns** and visions will not come. If we are then to talk seriously about the necessity of liberation, we are talking about the destruction of the whole complex of Western theories of knowledge and the construction of a new and more comprehensive synthesis of human knowledge and experience. This is no easy task and it cannot be accomplished people who are encompassed within the traditional Western logiC and the resulting analyses such logic provides. If we change the very way that Western peoples think, the way they collect data, which data they gather, and how they arrange that information, then we are speaking truly of liberation. For it is the manner in which people conceive reality that motivates them to behave in certain ways, that provides them with a system ofvalues, and that enables them to JUStify their activities. A new picture of reality, a reality conceived as a Vision and not as a series of related or connected ideas, can accomplish over a longer period oftime many changes we have been unable to effect while conceiving solutions as short-term remedies. M.ore important for our discussion is the recognition that all parts of human experience are related and the proposed solution to any particular problem overlooks the changes that will occur in related activities because of their relationship. Fundamental changes initiated by a new picture of reality will create a transformation, and will avoid the traditional replacement of **words with new words**. In summary we now challenge the basic assumptions of Western man. To wit: 1) that time is uniform and continuous; 2) that our species originated from a single source; 3) that our descriptions ofnature are absolute knowledge; 4) that the world can be divided into subjective and object 5) that our understanding of our species is homogeneous; 6) that ultimate reality, including divinity, is homogeneous; 7) that by projection of present conditions we can understand human history, planetary history, or the universe; 8) that inductive and deductive reasoning are the primary tools for gaining knowledge. As we create a new set of propositions that transcend these theses we will achieve liberation in a fundamental sense and the synthesis that emerges Will be a theology. But it will transform present feelings of sympathy to shared experiences, it will transform tolerance to understanding, and it Will transform appreciation ofseparate cultural traditions into a new universal cultural expression. And everyone will become liberated. (1977)

#### Native American thought is not a monolith; indeed, meaningful differences exist between disparate groups and individuals, just like any other on Earth. However, respecting and embracing the insights from indigenous cultures, through their differences and similarities, is better than perpetuating a status quo that marginalizes their contribution to scholarship and policy analysis. Infusing revelatory knowledge into objective policy analysis repudiates false ontological conceptions of science

Zimmerman 2006 [Mary Jane, Ph. D., Discussion Leader Being Nature’s Mind: Indigenous Ways of Knowing and Planetary Consciousness February 2, 2006, <http://www.earthspirituality.org/archive/zimmerman_seminar.htm>

In this section I will describe three models of ways of knowing from the Diné, the Yup’ik, and the Cree and Ojibway (Anishinabe) cultures. There is wide variety among Native American nations, however, when contrasted in a general way to Western ways of knowing, some broad commonalities can be seen. For example, each of these ways of knowing depends on a more open and fluid egoic structure than is common in European cultures and is connected to methods of childrearing which provide that more relational ego. According to David Begay and Nancy Maryboy, writing from the Diné perspective, Native American epistemology begins with the assumption, from experience, that everything in the cosmos is connected and that all physical bodies and all minds are expressions of a deeper spiritual essence (Begay and Maryboy 277). Since the human mind is part of a whole, interrelated cosmic process, it can enter into an awareness of that process. In their conclusion of a discussion of Diné epistemology, Begay and Maryboy state that “this epistemology cannot be fully conceptualized in terms of an individual person. The mind, body and spirit is intrinsically interrelated with the cosmic whole” (323). I begin my discussion of Native American epistemologies with that quotation because it highlights such a deep assumption in Western thought, that humans are individuals knowing a world out there. If modern humans stay within that assumption, they cannot even begin to understand Native ways of knowing. Instead, invert the primacy of the individual and begin to conceive of all individuals as arising out of a greater process that they exist within. How that greater process shows up in the consciousness of the various individuals is the knowledge of the whole process coming through the individual. Begay and Maryboy try to give Western readers a sense of Diné epistemology by explaining some Navajo terms, such as dzil (mountain). Whereas in English this term has purely physicalistic connotations (“a land mass higher than a hill” (Webster’s, ctd. in Begay and Maryboy 282)), in the Diné meaning it refers to a whole set of relationships and the ongoing movement inherent in those relationships. These relationships include the life cycles of the animals and plants which grow at different elevations, the weather patterns effected by the mountain, as well as the human’s experience of being with the mountain. All of these processes are dynamic, so one can speak of the dzil nanit’a, or the movement of the mountain. Begay and Maryboy explain this term as “the dynamic interrelationship and kinetic processes that regenerate and transform life” (288). Since this motion of the mountain is not separate from the entire cosmic process, one can only really come to know the mountain by learning about “the kinetic dynamics of the whole” (288), usually through years of study and ceremonial practice. Through such study and practice, a person can enter into close knowledge of the mountain and also knowledge of what the relationship is between the mountain and human consciousness. Begay and Maryboy state that “according to traditional thinking, dzil nanit’a bee nitsisikees, the holistic movement, as conceived through the mountain, is the human consciousness” (291). The human is closely related to the mountain because both exist at the center between Mother Earth and Father Sky. The mountain thus has the power to teach and to heal: “its very essence is the healing process.... The mountain itself is medicine” (296). The interconnection between the mountain and the human is expressed as dzil bii’ iistiin (usually translated as “the inner form of the mountain”). Begay and Maryboy conclude “thus the mountain is consciousness and consciousness is the mountain” (297). How does a person come to the understanding of the close connection between the human and the mountain? Begay and Maryboy discuss intra-subjectivity, entering into a oneness with the mountain: . . . one has to take one’s mind inside the mountain and become one with the mountain. Only then can one see the psyche (dzil bii’ iistiin) of the mountain. The human mind becomes aware of the intrinsic relationship as one with the mountain. One can look back at the human with the mountain’s mind, which is the human mind. (315) I have purposely chosen this quotation and the previous ones because I thought they might be confusing to non-Native readers. I do not understand them completely myself. But it is clear to me that the traditional people with whom Begay and Maryboy spoke knew something about the possible qualities of human consciousness which they learned by becoming one with the mountain. Also, this practice of knowing through intersubjectivity is not unique to the human-mountain relationship. Although that is the main example discussed in their dissertation, Begay and Maryboy have told me that it can be applied to any aspect of the natural world. Let me emphasize that such oneness between the human mind and the natural world is not the naive, prepersonal oneness of an undifferentiated infant (Wilber 31). It is the ability to enter into another part of the cosmic whole, an ability which takes many years of practice. Begay and Maryboy state that the Diné are just as capable of thinking objectively as Western people and of using their language to make objective statements. However, they are also always aware of “an intrinsic subjective relationship which is not nullified by an objective statement” (314). The capacity of intra-subjective knowing is not done unconsciously or automatically, and it does not preclude Western ways of knowing. It is an added capacity of awareness, not a primitive one. In his book, The Way of the Human Being, Calvin Luther Martin also discusses this ability to enter into the consciousness of another part of the whole. He tells many stories of boundary crossings from the Eskimo, Yup’ik , and other tribes, stories in which a person departs from the human realm and lives as another animal for a year or two, then returns to teach the other humans how to respect and relate to this animal. He advises his Western readers not to analyze such a story or categorize it as fiction, but to put it on and wear it, as one wears a parka, to live inside it for awhile until they can begin to hear the spirit (yua) of the story (2). If approached with openness, these stories can begin to teach us about another way of knowing the world: Something else, too, may happen: the story might seem to be thinking you rather than your thinking it. This is a potent thing and it is a legitimate thing, totally against common sense but nonetheless real. Don’t reject it; this is how an Eskimo would perceive such a story: it has yua. (3) Thus he warns, at the outset, that Westerners often can’t hear the teachings of these boundary crossing stories because they don’t know how to listen to them. All of these stories are about kinship. They are about learning to look at the human from the perspective of Seal, Whale, or Fox. And as Martin reports, people introduced themselves to him by saying, “I am Puffin,” or “I am Killer Whale,” not simply “I belong to the clan of . . .” (34-37). This sense of kinship extended to experiences of mutual respect. He notes that one woman was not afraid to go jogging on the back roads where bears were often encountered because her late husband had been a Bear. The bears, therefore, protected her (37). Another story tells of a great chief who was a Bear. When he died, a number of bears came out of the woods to the road as a truck brought his body up from the dock, some of them even standing up as the truck passed by (37). Thus, these stories of kinship and connection are about real relationships of reciprocal respect, not just isolated human imaginings. In fact, from this perspective of relationship and respect, the behavior of environmental biologists at work in this region is troubling to many of the traditional people. Catching, tranquilizing, and branding the bears, pulling their teeth to calculate age, and putting radio collars on them to track their movements are all considered by the biologists to be necessary for species preservation. They need data and see this as the only way to get it. They wouldn’t think to ask the Bear people, the ones who know and feel the bears, because such a way of getting information isn’t scientific. But the older people warn that this research is disrespectful, that it is “playing” with the bears, and that it will cause the bears to go away (108-113). Martin points out that these two epistemologies, the way of kinship and the way of science, spring from two different ontologies, the ontology of trust and the ontology of fear (205). Fearing that the earth will not provide leads to ways of knowing which have the goal of manipulation and control. But a core belief and experience in Native America is that the earth does provide bountifully to those who relate to it with respect. All the hunting stories are about animals who choose to give themselves to the hunters who behave respectfully (9). Hunting begins first in the mind, by contacting an animal through song (the medicine hunt). One then asks permission to take some flesh; when permission is granted, it is a gift from the animal of its robe (67). Its spirit lives on and must be honored through ceremonies of gratitude. Balance in the world is maintained when everyone lives within an ontology and an ethic of gift-giving: In a world where everything breathes with life, has motion, is intelligent with thought, and is kinsman, equilibrium can work only when everything is exchanged as a gift, rather than through theft, strategem, or “main force.” As, for instance, when an animal being gives itself freely, with full permission, to needy human brethren. And where humans keep their demands on these other beings modest, approaching them in ceremony that speaks of the original and everlasting kinship. (62) Some stories tell of hunters who cannot find game, but the problem is not the abundance of the animals; the problem is the hunter’s lack of perception. These stories point to a participatory understanding of reality. If we see the world as a place of gift, where the earth and the beings on the earth are fond of humans and want to help them, we will experience its abundance; we will be able to “participate in the conversation of the Gift” (79). If we see it as a place of fear, we will begin grasping, and what we grasp for will elude us. As Martin says, “The real issue lies in what physicists call the problem of measurement: whether we start . . . by measuring the world in fear or in trust” (205). Thus, these Native stories show a clear awareness that human attitudes and behavior have a role in calling forth the face of reality which we see (86).

#### Moreover, the arrogance with which energy policy ignores indigenous voices facilitates structural violence, environmental calamity, and is unsustainable

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The United States consumes a third of the resources of our sacred Earth Mother. This includes the resources of the oceans. This level of consumption that feeds the addictive appetite of the United States and its industrialized society causes continued intrusions and invasions into other peoples’ territories, including our indigenous homelands. A society based upon conquest and expropriation of the sacred is not sustainable. The current national and global economic system with its global corporations, fi nancial institutions, and governmental bureaucracies cannot survive without an ever-increasing supply of natural resources: forests, industrial agriculture, minerals, coal, uranium, oil and natural gas, fi sh, wildlife, water, and land. The dominant society’s economic paradigm, at all levels, places rapid economic growth, the quest for individual and corporate accumulation of wealth, and a race to exploit natural resources as its foundation. This economic system disregards the finite limits of Earth Mother in terms of natural resource availability, consumption, waste generation, and absorption. These issues continue to be compounded by the increasingly toxic nature and destructive practices of energy systems and mineral extractive industries, industrial-level agriculture, and a production system that creates wasteful by-products that few people want stored in their backyards. Many Tribal Nations are located in remote areas where municipal, industrial, federal, and military toxic and radioactive wastes continue to be dumped, burned, and stored. Recently, with the popularity of waste-to-energy incinerators and biomass plants, developers are coming into indigenous territories promoting these polluting facilities as green energy and green economy ventures. Our communities and villages are high health-risk communities from decades of radioactive and toxic exposure. There is a legacy of toxic chemicals disproportionately contaminating indigenous peoples. These chemicals bioaccumulate and biomagnify in the food chain of both processed foods and indigenous traditional and subsistence food systems. Most federal environmental, ecological, and health risk assessment management and assessment models do not protect the indigenous peoples of the United States, Canada, and the world. Our children are especially vulnerable. The current extraction of materials, the production of waste, and the level of consumption within industrial development are not sustainable. Indigenous peoples and indigenous organizations in North America and worldwide understand that Earth Mother and her resources cannot sustain the consumption and production needs of this modern industrialized society, including the waste that is created. This includes the high level of energy that is required to power up industrial production and consumption. Our communities still live in the reality of outdated, toxic, and unsustainable energy policies. Colonization has always been about land and who owns and controls it. Some of our indigenous traditional territories—full of coal, oil, gas, and uranium—are under attack by mining companies. Other sources of energy development such as large hydro dam projects in North America and throughout the world have flooded our territories, including our homelands, culture, history, and burial sites. This is not sustainable development. **P E A K O I L** The end of cheap energy, what is called “peak oil,” is bringing dramatic shifts in North America and the world. Depletions of inexpensive, or conventional, oil and gas supplies threaten the survival of industrial nations and industrialism itself, at its present scale. Long distance transportation, industrial food systems, complex urban and suburban systems, and many market commodities basic to our present way of life, including autos, plastics, chemicals, pesticides, and refrigeration, are all rooted in the basic assumption of an ever-increasing, inexpensive energy supply. This is not sustainable. Unconventional oil and fossil fuel reserves remain plentiful, but have not been economically feasible to obtain and process until the recent decade. While the world is talking about mitigating climate change, it is business-as-usual with the expansion of fossil fuel development within or near indigenous territories. Under the Obama administration, the push for American energy security is opening a wide doorway for expanding unconventional fossil fuel development. Following are current unconventional oil developments in indigenous territories: 1. Our brothers and sisters at the top of the world in Alaska are being bombarded by the threats of increased oil development, both on land and offshore. Resisting Environmental Destruction on Indigenous Lands (REDOIL), an Alaska Native grassroots alliance, has been resisting efforts of the United States and Shell to pursue oil drilling in the sensitive Arctic region, including the offshore Outer Continental Shelf areas of the Beaufort and Chukchi seas. Offshore oil drilling, as proposed by President Obama, threatens Alaska Natives’ way of life, and perpetuates U.S. addiction to oil and the concentration of greenhouse gas emissions that contribute to global warming and climate change. It is of utmost importance to institute a federal time-out on the proposed offshore development within the Outer Continental Shelf areas in Alaska. It has not been proven whether cleaning up spills in broken ice conditions is possible. The implications to subsistence ways of life and human health of Alaska coastal communities have not been adequately reviewed. Impacts to polar bears and other threatened and endangered Arctic marine species have not been thoroughly studied. 2. The public in the United States and even in Canada are not aware of what is happening in the tar sands “sacrifice” zone of northern Alberta, Canada. These tar sands are the second largest oil deposit in the world, bigger than Iraq, Iran, or Russia, exceeded only by Saudi Arabia. For years, the mining and processing of this heavy crude, tarlike substance was too expensive to process and was considered unconventional. Binational agreements between the United States and Canada will eventually import 80 percent of the Alberta tar/ oil sands crude oil to feed U.S. energy needs resulting in unprecedented human rights violations and ecological destruction in the homelands of the Mikisew Cree, Athabasca Dene, and the Métis. Tar sands development has completely altered the Athabasca delta and watershed landscape, with deforestation of the boreal forests, open pit mining, in situ mining, dewatering of the water systems, toxic contamination, and degradation to the ecosystem. Canada is not meeting its Kyoto Protocol climate agreements due to the carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions released by the tar sands development. This tar sands expansion has been called the tip of the nonconventional fuels iceberg and consists of a fossil fuel far more carbon intensive than conventional oil. This tip of the iceberg in the development of unconventional fossil fuels includes oil shale, liquid coal, ultra-heavy oils, and ultra-deep offshore deposits. Extraction of these bottom-of-the-barrel fuels emits higher levels of greenhouse gases and creates ecological devastation. In Utah, on federal lands, there is an emerging frenzy of companies lining up to tap the tar sands and oil shale there. 3. The toxic legacy left by fossil fuel and uranium development on indigenous lands remains today and will persist for generations, even without additional development. Mines and electrical generation facilities have had devastating health and cultural impacts on our indigenous peoples at all stages of the energy cycle, ranging from cancer from radioactive uranium waste in Laguna Pueblo and the Navajo Nation in New Mexico, to respiratory illness caused by coal-fi red power plant and oil refi nery air emissions on and near Native lands, such as Fort Berthold Three Affi liated Tribes in North Dakota or the Navajo of the Shiprock area of northwest New Mexico, to acute respiratory illnesses of the Ponca Nation in north central Oklahoma. Indigenous communities have been targeted in all proposals for long-term nuclear waste storage, such as the Western Shoshone in Nevada, or the Prairie Island Mdewankanton Dakota community in eastern Minnesota who live next door to a nuclear power reactor and are experiencing elevated incidences of cancer and other illnesses. The history of resource exploitation, including conventional energy resources, in indigenous territories was highlighted by the recently settled Elouise Cobell lawsuit against the Department of the Interior on behalf of individual Native landowners. The systematic exploitation by the U.S. government and corporations of conventional energy resources has run an equally long and often deadly course in our lands. Under federalism, our energy resource Tribes have supplied access to abundant natural resources under U.S. federal trust protection at rock-bottom prices in sweetheart deals promoted by the federal government. Yet many of our local communities and families living in remote areas of Tribal reservations often go unserved or underserved by the benefi ts of such development. Even the most recent U.S. energy legislation and incentives are designed to encourage the development of Tribal resources, with mechanisms for fast-tracking the siting and permitting process. Development must not be a forced choice. For the United States to provide incentives for further fossil fuels and uranium development in indigenous territories will only continue the pattern of ignoring the well-being of our communities and Alaska Native villages in favor of short-sighted proposals that exploit the vulnerabilities of poor, politically isolated communities. When considering energy and climate change policy, it is important that the White House and federal agencies, and even our emerging Tribal leaders, our youth, and Native academia, consider the history of energy and mineral exploitation and Native Nations, and the potential to create a dramatic change with innovative policies. Too often Native Nations are presented with a false choice: either to develop polluting energy resources or remain in dire poverty. Economic development need not come at the expense of maintaining spiritual principles, cultural identity, and thriving ecosystems.

#### The question of the aff is of the survival of the planet – Western thinking’s monological approach to cultural thought endangers any context for an ethical relationship to the planet and places us on the path of collective suicide – expanding the limits of knowledge as affirmed by the 1ac are vital to any ethical relationship to the planet. We are all related – our patterns of thinking must reflect this.

Friedberg 2000 [Lilian, Dare to compare: Americanizing the Holocaust By: Friedberg, Lilian, American Indian Quarterly, 0095182X, June 1, 2000, Vol. 24, Issue 3

Giorgio Agamben has argued against the use of the term Holocaust as a descriptor for the Nazi extermination of the Jews because "Jews were exterminated not in a mad and giant holocaust but exactly as Hitler had announced, 'as lice,' which is to say as bare life."[43] The notorious California Indian-killer H. L. Hall justified the murder of Native infants based on the argument that "a nit would make a louse." John Chivington, commanding colonel in the infamous Sand Creek Massacre, reformulated the sentiment to justify similar actions with the statement "Nits make lice."[44] Perplexing in this context is that Hitler's perception of the Jews as "life unworthy of living," that is, as "lice" or "bare life," is received with moral outrage in the scholarly community and in public consciousness in the U.S. and elsewhere. But when Indians are placed on the same level of the "evolutionary scale" and assigned the same status in the biopolitical order, it becomes a justifiable sacrifice made in the name of "progress." Hitler's willing executioners and the ordinary men and women of Germany had to be convinced that the Jewish population was not human; they had, after all, for centuries prior, lived and worked side by side with these people who were systematically exterminated as "like lice." Before the Final Solution could be implemented, the Jewish population of Europe had to be reduced to the level of "bare life." But for the American settlers, the notion that the life form to be clear-cut from the vast, "unpopulated" wilderness in order to make way for their American way of life was somehow not human ranked among those truths held to be self-evident; the "execrable race" of red men and women was viewed from the very onset as existing at the level of "bare life." And yet, from a perspective that acknowledges the essential humanity of indigenous populations and the sophistication of the established forms of social organization, governance, and religious ritual prevailing among the indigenous populations at the time of contact, it becomes clear that, while the Nazi Holocaust was indeed unique in scope and in kind to the twentieth century, the American Holocaust was, as Stannard has stated, "far and away, the most massive act of genocide in the history of the world."[45] Fortunately, Hitler was stopped before he could consummate the Final Solution. But some contend that Uncle Sam's willing executioners are still today engaged in the effort to eradicate what remains of the indigenous population in North America. For others, the loss of Native lives and lifeways cannot be acknowledged as homicidal, genocidal, or suicidal because the "savage" is not--however ostentatiously liberal-minded individuals and institutions in this country may contend otherwise--considered fully human: "we" are not related. While a revisionist narrative of the West would attempt to suffuse its world-view with a politically correct moral underpinning by making superficial linguistic concessions, no longer applying such terms as "savage" and "primitive" to indigenous peoples, contemporary scholarship still draws its insights and impulses from the same body of research and the same doctrine of universal superiority it now seeks to disavow and revile. The appearance of euphemisms such as "ethnocide" and "depopulation" applied to the genocide committed against Native populations is just one index of the continued resistance to the notion that this devastation involves a human tragedy. Nominally, indigenous peoples have been grudgingly adopted into the "family of man" in the prevailing paradigms of Western thought. Phenomenologically, they are still today perceived not as human others, but in fact as a separate (and inferior) "species." Depending on one's interpretation of the Latin siluaticus (of the wood; belonging to a wood), from which the term "savage" is derived, one might suspect that, in the Western biopolitical order, the "savage life" acquires the status of one less than bare life or Homo sacer. If that is the case, then what occurred in this country must be viewed as a gigantic bonfire in which neither mice, lice, nor men, women or children were sacrificed and burned for the sake of clear-cutting a space for the master race--what was sacrificed here were merely logs. Driftwood. Dead weight. Useless waste. In the world of the uniqueness proponents, the "depopulation" of the New World is on a par with "deforestation." What is perhaps "unique" about the Nazi Holocaust is that it represents the first incidence in history of genocidal assault directed at an assimilated, "civilized" (and therefore human) population in central Europe.[46] Katz refers to the phenomenon as one of "Judeocide." It might, however, more accurately be termed fratricide--brothers killing brothers--squabbling sons of the same God in a serial rerun of Cain and Abel. This is not to imply that fratricide is any less grievous a crime against humanity than genocide, merely to clarify the relationship of spiritual kinship existing between perpetrators and victims in the Nazi Holocaust and the way this works to influence our perception of the event's primacy. It could in fact be argued that fratricide is indeed the more heinous crime since it involves the extermination of life that is dearly defined as "human" in the Judeo-Christian paradigm. Brothers killing brothers is classified as a mortal sin by the religious doctrines governing moral standards in both religions, but brothers killing savages is apparently sanctioned by the moral dictates of both these dominant world religions. If the ideology of Manifest Destiny is, on the other hand, subsumed under the mandate to "be fruitful and multiply," then the extermination of indigenous populations is indeed ordained by the supreme deity common to the Christian and the Judaic faiths. From this perspective, mass murder is the implied mandate of Manifest Destiny. Churchill speaks in terms of the need for a "denazification ... a fundamental alteration in the consciousness of this country."[47] I would suggest that "demanifestation" is a more apt designation for the paradigmatic shift requisite for decentering the hegemonistic reign of the "master narratives" of Manifest Destiny and the master race that govern our understanding of history as it relates to national identity in the United States. Thinking in terms of "de-manifestation" has the advantage of disaggregating the specific modalities of similar, but not identical, historical phenomena and of dislocating--geographically and intellectually--the source of the "problem" from the site of European history to that of American history. What follows is an attendant shift in temporal focus that allows us to properly place the postulates of Manifest Destiny and the master race in historically correct chronological order with relation to the subsequent emergence of theories of Lebensraumpolitik and the assumed superiority of the Aryan race on the European continent. Whereas "denazification" clearly connotes a "thing of the past," "de-manifestation" implies a present, "manifest" reality. From this vantage point, the German Sonderweg is rerouted and an already trammeled trail of rampant plundering, pillage, and mass murder is revealed to have been blazed in the forward wake of the historical caesura that the Nazi Holocaust represents. [HOLOCAUST IN CONTEMPORARY CONTEXT: COLLECTIVE SUICIDE](http://ehis.ebscohost.com.ezproxy.lib.ou.edu/eds/detail?vid=2&hid=115&sid=41bfcb58-c42e-478c-b039-f30bcd57366d%40sessionmgr114&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWRzLWxpdmU%3d#toc) Most importantly, perhaps, what distinguishes the American Holocaust from the Nazi Holocaust is what is at stake today. The Nazi Holocaust represents a historical event that threatened the entire Jewish population of Europe. Relegating this event to the archive of oblivion would involve a fatal miscalculation resulting in wholesale moral bankruptcy for the entire Western world. But the worldwide Jewish population can hardly be said to be at risk of extermination today--certainly not in the United States. American Jews stepped up their efforts to direct attention to the Nazi Holocaust at a time when they were by far the wealthiest, best-educated, most influential, in-every-way-most-successful group in American society--a group that, compared to most other identifiable minority groups, suffered no measurable discrimination and no disadvantages on account of that minority status.[48] Norman Finkelstein cites the Jewish income in the United States at double that of non-Jews and points out that sixteen of the forty wealthiest Americans are Jews, as are 40 percent of Nobel prizewinners in science and economics, 20 percent of professors at major universities and 40 percent of partners in law firms in New York and Washington.[49] Native Americans, by contrast, have long been subject to the most extreme poverty of any sector in the present North American population, and still have the highest rate of suicide of any other ethnic group on the continent.[50] Highschool dropout rates are as high as 70 percent in some communities. As Anishinabeg activist and Harvard-educated scholar Winona LaDuke notes with regard to the Lakota population in South Dakota: "Alcoholism, unemployment, suicide, accidental death and homicide rates are still well above the national average."[51] Alcoholism, intergenerational posttraumatic stress, and a spate of social and economic ills continue to plague these communities in the aftermath of the American Holocaust. As Peter Novik has made abundantly clear in his study of the way the Holocaust functions as a sort of"civil religion" and signifier of identity for American Jews, much of the commemoration rhetoric and practice propagated in this country centers on maintaining a consensual symbol of unity for American Jews who thus experience the Holocaust "vicariously." As Novik states, while most American Jews (and Gentiles) may be saddened, dismayed, or shocked by the Nazi Holocaust, there is little evidence to suggest that they have actually been traumatized by it.[52] The Americanization of the Holocaust, according to Novik's analysis, serves a symbolic function for American Jews, ascribing victim status to a community that demonstrates little sign of actual victimization in a culture where the victim is victor. Norman Finkelstein, the vociferous Goldhagen critic who lost most of his family in the death camps and ghettoes of Nazi-occupied Europe, has expressed similar views. His forthcoming publication asserts that the "Holocaust industry" was born with the Six-Day War in June of 1967. Before that, there was little mention of the Holocaust in American life.He argues that the development of the "Holocaust industry" in the United States is part of a strategic campaign to justify American political interests in Israel.[53] This is not to deny or diminish the clear and present danger in the ominous resurgence of anti-Semitic sentiments reflected in isolated incidences of racial violence against Jews and Jewish institutions both here and abroad. However, the material realities confronting the Native American population remain, in many instances, comparable to those prevailing in Third World countries. The Native American experience of persecution is not a vicarious one. For substantial portions of this population, it is a lived reality. What is more, an unrelenting sentiment of Indian-hating persists in this country: There is a peculiar kind of hatred in the northwoods, a hatred born of the guilt of privilege, a hatred born of living with three generations of complicity in the theft of lives and lands. What is worse is that each day, those who hold this position of privilege must come face to face with those whom they have dispossessed. To others who rightfully should share in the complicity and the guilt, Indians are far away and long ago. But in reservation border towns, Indians are ever present. ... The poverty of dispossession is almost overwhelming. So is the poverty of complicity and guilt. In America, poverty is relative, but it still causes shame. That shame, combined with guilt and a feeling of powerlessness, creates an atmosphere in which hatred buds, blossoms, and flourishes. The hatred passes from father to son and from mother to daughter. Each generation feels the hatred and it penetrates deeper to justify a myth.[54] Attempts on the part of American Indians to transcend chronic, intergenerational maladies introduced by the settler population (for example, in the highly contested Casino industry, in the ongoing battles over tribal sovereignty, and so on) are challenged tooth and nail by the U.S. government and its "ordinary" people. Flexibility in transcending these conditions has been greatly curtailed by federal policies that have "legally" supplanted our traditional forms of governance, outlawed our languages and spirituality, manipulated our numbers and identity, usurped our cultural integrity, viciously repressed the leaders of our efforts to regain self-determination, and systematically miseducated the bulk of our youth to believe that this is, if not just, at least inevitable."[55] Today's state of affairs in America, both with regard to public memory and national identity, represents a flawless mirror image of the situation in Germany vis-hvis Jews and other non-Aryan victims of the Nazi regime.[56] Collective indifference to these conditions on the part of both white and black America is a poor reflection on the nation's character. This collective refusal to acknowledge the genocide further exacerbates the aftermath in Native communities and hinders the recovery process. This, too, sets the American situation apart from the German-Jewish situation: Holocaust denial is seen by most of the world as an affront to the victims of the Nazi regime. In America, the situation is the reverse:victims seeking recovery are seen as assaulting American ideals. But what is at stake today, at the dawn of a new millennium, is not the culture, tradition, and survival of one population on one continent on either side of the Atlantic. What is at stake is the very future of the human species. LaDuke, in her most recent work, contextualizes the issues from a contemporary perspective: Our experience of survival and resistance is shared with many others. But it is not only about Native people. ... In the final analysis, the survival of Native America is fundamentally about **the collective survival of all** human beings. The question of who gets to determine the destiny of the land, and of the people who live on it--those with the money or those who pray on the land--is a question that is alive throughout society.[57] "There is," as LaDuke reminds us, "a direct relationship between the loss of cultural diversity and the loss of biodiversity. Wherever Indigenous peoples still remain, there is also a corresponding enclave of biodiversity."[58] But, she continues, The last 150 years have seen a great holocaust. There have been more species lost in the past 150 years than since the Ice Age. (During the same time, Indigenous peoples have been disappearing from the face of the earth. Over 2,000 nations of Indigenous peoples have gone extinct in the western hemisphere and one nation disappears from the Amazon rainforest every year.)[59] It is not about "us" as indigenous peoples--it is about "us" as a human species. We are all related. At issue is no longer the "Jewish question" or the "Indian problem." We must speak today in terms of the "human problem." And it is this "problem" for which not a "final," but a sustainable, viable solution must be found--because it is no longer a matter of "serial genocide," it has become one of collective suicide. As Terrence Des Pres put it, in The Survivor: "At the heart of our problems is that nihilism which was all along the destiny of Western culture: a nihilism either unacknowledged even as the bombs fell or else, as with Hitler or Stalin, demonically proclaimed as the new salvation."[60] All of us must now begin thinking and acting in the dimension and in the interest of the human species--an intellectual domain of vita activa that indigenous people have inhabited since time immemorial. It is this modality of thought as a process of reflection that the "civilized" nations must learn from the "savage" ones. Vine Deloria, in "Native American Spirituality," has attempted to clarify this distinction: American Indians look backwards in time to the creation of the world and view reality from the perspective of the one species that has the capability to reflect on the meaning of things. This attitude is generally misunderstood by non-Indians who act as if reflection and logical thought were synonymous. But reflection is a special art and requires maturity of personality, certainty of identity, and feelings of equality with the other life forms of the world. It consists, more precisely, of allowing wisdom to approach rather than seeking answers to self-generated questions. Such an attitude, then, stands in a polarized position to the manner in which society today conducts itself.[61] It is not a matter of moral bookkeeping or of winners and losers in the battle of the most martyred minority. It is not a matter of comparative victimology, but one of collective survival. The insistence on incomparability and "uniqueness" of the Nazi Holocaust is precisely what prohibits our collective comprehension of genocide as a phenomenon of Western "civilization," not as a reiterative series of historical events, each in its own way "unique." It is what inhibits our ability to name causes, anticipate outcomes, d, above all to engage in preemptive political and intellectual action in the face of contemporary exigencies. In Tabori's 1990 production Weisman and Rotgesicht, the "calculus of calamity" is taken to hilarious heights to reveal the grave truth of the matter. In his 1994 discussion of "The Contemporary German Fascination for Things Jewish," Jack Zipes states of Weisman und Rotgesicht: The resolution that Tabori offers, though hilarious, is meant to be taken seriously: a verbal duel so that both sides can expose themselves and realize how ridiculous it is to quarrel with one another. Hilarity becomes a nomadic means of questioning majority culture and of reversing identities so that understanding between different groups can be generated.[62] Ultimately, fostering a "solidarity of memory" that might fundamentally challenge majority culture must he the aim of any comparison of "minority" situations, but the conclusion Zipes draws from this particular conflation of identities in conflict is flawed by a misapprehension of the play's historically and culturally specific geographic setting in the Western wilderness and its relationship to indigenous peoples. As I have argued elsewhere, while Tabori does not specify the site of the duel in the desert, the play could be interpreted to be set in what is now the state of Colorado.[63] This is the site of the Sand Creek Massacre--a historical event with culturally specific meaning to the Native American people. It is at once a site of sanctity, of sacrifice, and of sacrilege. It represents the rampant desecration that has devastated an entire civilization and its way of life. But according to Jack Zipes's analysis: "There are many parallels that one can draw with the conflict in this play: Jews and blacks in the States, or blacks and Koreans; Jews and Turks in Germany; Jews and Arabs in the Middle East."[64] Clearly, other subaltern Others share similar relationships to other, more distant desert lands and wilderness landscapes, but Zipes's analogies are flawed on several counts. In the case of the conflicts between the first two groups cited, the element of violent conquest and the dispossession of lands at the heart of the American Indian-European immigrant "dispute" is absent: Jews and blacks, like Jews and Koreans, are engaged in a struggle for cultural, racial, economic, and social equity in territories to which they have been introduced as Others--either as slaves, immigrants, or refugees. In the German-Turkish situation, the "minority" group is the "alien element" or, as the German euphemism would have it, "guest workers." None of these struggles involves legal agreements between sovereign nations--that is to say treaties between sovereign political entities-the terms of which have not been upheld by an outlaw state whose legitimacy as a "world power" is nevertheless recognized by the international community. As Seth Wolitz has stated in this regard, "the text can also be read allegorically as a version of the Israeli-Palestinian encounter between two subalterns squabbling over land which the 'Gewittergoi', the imperialist powers, can always regain and control."[65] The problem with this allegory, though, is that the North American territories that function as the setting and backdrop for the territories at issue in the Indian-immigrant conflict have yet to be manumitted from colonialist bondage. The lands remain in control of the "imperialist power." Precisely this is central to understanding the double-edged ironies and conflicts addressed in Weisman und Rotgesicht. The setting involves a geographical site that is readily associated with the actual site of a massacre and, as such, the site itself is ambiguous: it signifies both a site of (ongoing) sanctity and one of (ongoing) desecration. If the parallel is to be drawn between the Jewish and American Indian subaltern situations, the course of history as well as the present state of affairs must be taken into account: the fact is that Hitler lost the war and the State of Israel was formed as partial reparation for the losses sustained by the Jewish population as a result. However, the United States government, even as it sought to help absorb the losses sustained by the Jewish population in Europe not only through its support of Israel, but by offering refuge to Jewish immigrants in territories seized from the indigenous populations, won its war against the Indians.[66] The crucial difference between a regime whose demise was rooted in genocide and one for whom genocide was its foundational principle and the prerequisite to its existence is elided by this analogy. Moreover, at the level of sheer abstraction, the solidarity between subaltern groups that the Jewish-American tradition of "spoofing" Jewish-Indian relations seeks to evoke is marred by its unilateral initiative -- emanating from the Jewish perspective in the context of a Judeo-Christian framework that demonstrates little regard for or knowledge of the cultural and religious world-views of Native Americans, either as a collective entity or as heterogeneous individual nations--each with its own relationship to specific geographic sites within the boundaries of occupied territories now defined as the United States. The land, "the Wilderness" or "the Desert" which has come to signify a "wasteland" in the symbolic and spiritual orders of other peoples, has never been associated with anything but abundance and eternal sustenance for indigenous peoples because revelation is rooted in the life of reflection on and with the land, not in catastrophic upheaval or divine intervention. Vine Deloria explains the "problem" of misconstrued understandings of this relationship in this way: Almost every tribal religion was based on land. ... Some of the old chiefs felt that, because generations of their ancestors had been buried on the lands and because the sacred events of their religion had taken place on the lands, they were obligated to maintain the tribal lands against new kinds of exploitation. ... Especially among the Pueblos, Hopi, and Navajo, the lands of the creation and emergence traditions are easily identified and are regarded as places of utmost significance. ...Government officials have ruthlessly disregarded the Indians' pleas for the restoration of their most sacred lands, and the constant dispute between Indians and whites centers around this subject.[67] If anything sets the American Indian apart from other victims of genocide or oppression in this country, it is this: Native Americans are not, in the strictest sense of the word, a "diasporic" people.[68] While the policies of Indian Removal certainly served to disperse, displace, disparage, and dislocate Native cultures and identities from coast to coast, imposing upon Native North American peoples conditions of existence that might be described as "diasporic" in a Judeo-Christian or postcolonialist context, I would caution against the appropriation of the diasporic metaphor with regard to the state of Native North America. The traditional Deuteronomic narrative of the Diaspora implies divine punishment in response to a breach of covenant. In order for a "diasporic" situation to prevail, the peoples of the diaspora must have entered into a contract with the divinely intervening deity. But indigenous peoples of this country stood in no such relationship to the Judeo-Christian God and his sovereign representatives on Earth. The notion of a "Native Diaspora" in the United States presupposes an adherence to the doctrine of Manifest Destiny as divine intervention on the part of the Judeo-Christian God in His effort to create "living space" or Lebensraum for His children--"chosen" and "unchosen" alike. Even if we were to accept the contemporary permutations of the concept in the postcolonialist attempt to subvert and decenter traditional narratives of nationalism and imperialism as these relate to identity formation and the location of culture, the diasporic metaphor is inapplicable because the peoples and lands at issue here have yet to be manumitted from neo-colonialist bondage. Uprootedness, homelessness, exile--these are maladies forced upon Native North American populations by the invading Europeans. What Simone Weil has written about this affliction in reference to Euro-African relations in Africa applies equally to the situation on Turtle Island. [T]he white man carries [uprootedness] about with him wherever he goes. The disease has even penetrated the heart of the African continent, which had for thousands of years, nevertheless, been made up of villages. These black people at any rate, when nobody came to massacre them, torture them, or reduce them to slavery, knew how to live happily on their land. Contact with us is making them lose the art. That ought to make us wonder whether even the black man, although the most primitive of all colonized peoples, hadn't after all more to teach us than to learn from us.[69] Native Americans have been "extirpated" as "savages" and as "barbarians" on their own soil. That soil has been contaminated by pestilence, poisons, toxins, oil spills, nuclear waste dumps and all the other deadly by-products Western "civilization" inevitably leaves as its legacy. Sacred sites have been effaced; graves have been robbed. Synagogues and churches can be rebuilt, but Mount Rushmore is not likely to be restored to its original glory by geological cosmetic surgery. Taken literally, James Young's figurative language in "America's Holocaust: Memory and the Politics of Identity," is laced with mordant irony: By themselves monuments are of little value, mere stones in the landscape. But as part of a nation's rites or the objects of a people's national pilgrimage, they are imbued with national soul and memory. For traditionally the state-sponsored memory of a national past aims to affirm the righteousness of a nation's birth, even its divine election. The matrix of a nation's monuments emplots the story of ennobling events, of triumphs over barbarism, and recalls the martyrdom of those who gave their lives in the struggle for national existence--who in the martyrological refrain, died so that a nation might live. In assuming the idealized forms and meanings assigned this era by the state, memorials tend to concretize particular historical interpretations. They suggest themselves in indigenous, even geological outcroppings in a national landscape; in time, such idealized memory grows as natural to the eye as the landscape in which it stands."[70] [emphasis mine] The irony of his statements is certainly not lost on Young, who concludes his discussion with a section titled "Against a Culture of Competing Catastrophes," and states:"In the end we must recognize that memory cannot be divorced from the actions taken in its behalf, and that memory without consequences may even contain the seeds of its own destruction."[71] The "national monument" at Mount Rushmore represents the geographic and symbolic site in which the principles of Manifest Destiny and the master race are literally set in stone.[71] Only when the sanctity in the hearts and minds of the indigenous population of this "vast, untamed wilderness" itself has been duly acknowledged-when the dominant culture finally comes to grips with the fact that the ground they walk upon is not like a temple to the American Indian--it is the temple-then, and only then, will the nature of the devastation and desecration be driven home to them. Once that has been established, the essentially suicidal nature of Western intellectual endeavor will also become apparent. The savage--an entity reduced in the Western scheme of things to the level of "bare (and hence disposable) life" on a par with the plant--reveals himself, in the Native American world-view, to be precisely that: nothing more and nothing less than the tree itself--equals in a covenant and an evolutionary chain that does not shackle or bind, but merely bonds. To the Native American sense and sensibility, the tree represents life itself, and there is no split between the life of the tree and the life of the human. They are holistically, historically, and happily related in the nexus of mutually sustainable symbiosis. If, following Agamben, "homo sacer is life that may be killed but not sacrificed ... life that may be killed by anyone without committing homicide," then no crime has been committed in the American Holocaust, nor is the dearth of "academic moves," "scholarly turns," and "paradigmatic shifts" toward a fundamental rethinking and reshaping of American national identity of any consequence in global, local, or national terms.[73] There has been no "human" sacrifice in the conquest of the West.Nothing but the forest has been lost to the victor culture. But, if Native theorists, religious leaders, and activists who have survived the holocausts are correct in asserting, as they do, that the fate of the forest will be that of man, then the master race is, in fact, engaged in the specter of committing collective suicide--exercising the authority of the sovereign over life and death on all our behalf. If we are to divert the disaster, Mount Rushmore must be placed on a par with burning synagogues, whose fires can never be extinguished, and with black churches in the South subjected to racially motivated acts of arson. If the "Jews are the Indians of Germany," then Mount Rushmore is Bitburg, writ large and indelible, engraved not only in our collective memory, but spat on the very floor of the temple--a civic memorial to a people and a way of life sacrificed to someone else's "God."[74] But it is also here that the master race, ex altera terra, has signed and sealed its own fate on this continent as that of homo sacer: A life that, excepting itself in double exclusion from the real context of both the profane and the religious forms of life, is defined solely by virtue of having entered into an intimate symbiosis with death without, nevertheless, belonging to the world of the deceased.[75] The stones speak volumes that continue to fall on the deaf ears of an American public more German than the Germans in its persistent refusal to come to terms with a "little matter of genocide," choosing instead to adopt as its own the foundling stone of a historical marker--that coveted historical caesura everyone wants to have, but no one wants to own in the "Americanization of the Holocaust."[76] But in the canyons of deep memory, the song of the stones still echoes and rings true for the three million survivors of the American Holocaust.

#### Our criticism of status quo policymaking and energy policy is thus: why can we assume that a mere adjustment in where and how we get our energy can we make productive strides to alter the mentalities that have brought us to the brink of collapse? We must begin with the fundamental questions of knowledge and our orientations to the world. It is a tale of historical accident and arrogance that we have become intertwined to the belief that Western thinking holds the absolute claim to knowledge, Deloria refutes this and offers a different possibility for thinking, this is Deloria in 1999

Vine Deloria Jr 1999 [Theologian, legal scholar, JD, Ph.D, M.Div, standing rock Sioux, For This Land, 102-105

Example after example could be cited, each testifying to the devastating effect of a general attitude toward the world that underlies the Western approach to human knowledge. The basis of this attitude is the assurnption that the world operates in certain predetermined ways, that it operates continuously under certain natural laws, and that the nature of every species is homogeneous, with few real deviations. One can trace this attitude back into the Western past. Religious concepts, which have since been transformed into scientific and political beliefs, remain objects of belief as securely as if they had never been severed from their theological moorings. Let us trace a few examples. Originally the continuity of the world. was conceived as a demonstration ofthe divine plan and God, conceived as a lawgiver in the moral sense, became a law-giver in the scientific sense also. Scientific data was classified in certain ways that in the eyes of western peoples became a part ofthe structure of nature. Phenomena that did not fit into the structure that had been created were said to "vio late" the laws of nature and hence to be untrue in the religious sense and unimportant in the scientific sense. When evolution replaced the concept ofcreation in the book ofGenesis, it became an inviolable law in the eyes of Western people in much the same way that the literal inter pretation of the biblical story had been accepted by Western people in former centuries. The world was originally conceived in terms of the Near East as the center of reality. As awareness extended to other peoples, this world gradually expanded until by the Middle Ages it encompassed those regions that were in commercial contact with Western Europe. The dis covery ofthe Western hemisphere created a certain degree of trauma, for suddenly there was an awareness oflands and peoples ofwhich Western Europeans had no previous knowledge. The only way that these people could be accounted for was by reference to the Scriptures. So it was hy pOthesized that the aboriginal peoples in North and South America must have been the 'ten Lost 'tribes of Israel who had crossed into the New World over a land bridge somewhere in northern Asia. The basic aSsumption of this theory was the creation of the human species as a single act, performed by the Christian God, with its subsequent history one of populating the planet. The rise of social science, and the downgrading oftheological answers to What were considered scientific questions concerning the nature and hIStory of human societies, meant that social science had to provide answers to questions formulated within the theological context. With virtually no reconsideration of the basic question of the creation (or origination in SCientific terms) of our species as the product of a single act, anthro pologists promptly adopted the old theological explanation of the peopling of the Western Hemisphere, developing the Bering Strait theory of migration to account for the phenomenon. Whether secular or sacred, the classification of American natives as a derivative, inferior group of Asian-European peoples, albeit far removed from those roots by the pOstulation of many millenia of wandering, became a status from which American Indians have been unable to escape. The emphasis on objective knowledge by Western peoples has meant the development of an attitude that sees reality as basically physical, the knowledge there of basically mental or verbal, and the elimination of any middle ground between extremes. Thus religion has become a matter of the proper exposition of doctrines, and non-Western religions have been judged on their development of a systematic moral and ethical code rather than the manner in which they conducted themselves. When a religion is conceived as a code of verbal importance rather than a way of life, loopholes in the code become more important than the code itself since, by eliminating or escaping the direct violation of the code by a redefinition of the code or a relaxation of its intended effect, one can maintain two types ofbehavior, easily discerned in a practical way, as if they were identical and consistent with a particular picture of reality. In recent decades Western science had made an important discovery, important at least for Western peoples who had formerly confused themselves with their own belief system. Western science was premised upon the proposition that God had made the world according to certain laws. These laws were capable of discovery by human reason, and the task of science was to discover as many of these laws as possible. So human knowledge was misconceived as the only description of physical reality, a tendency Alfred North Whitehead called the principle of "misplaced concreteness." With the articulation of theories of indeterminancy in modern physics, this naive attitude toward human knowledge radically shifted and became an acknowledgement that what we had formerly called nature was simply our knowledge of nature based upon the types of questions we had decided to use to organize the measurements we were making ofthe physical world. The shift in emphasis meant that all knowledge became a relative knowledge, valid only for the types of questions we were capable of formulating. Depending upon the types of information sought, we could measure and observe certain patterns ofphenomena, but these patterns existed in our heads rather than in nature itself. Knowledge thus became a matter of cultural preference rather than an indication ofthe ultimate structure of reality. Presumably if one culture asked a certain type of question while another asked another type ofquestion, the two different answers could form two valid perspectives on the world. Whether these two perspectives could be reconciled in one theory of knowledge depended upon the broader pattern of interpretation that thinkers broUght into play with respect to the data. When this new factor of interpretationis applied specifically to different cultures and traditions, we can see that what have been called primitive superstitions have the potential of being regarded as sophisticated insights into the nature of things, at least on an equal basis with Western knowledge. The traditional manner in which Western peoples think is now only one of the possible ways ofdescribing a natural process. It may not, in even be as accurate, insofar as it can relate specific facts without perverting them, as non-Western ways of correlating knowledge. This uncertainty is liberating in a much more fundamental way than any other development in the history of Western civilization. It means that religious, political, economic, and historical analyses of human activities that have been derived from the Western tradition do not have an absolute claim upon us. We are free to seek a new synthesis that draws information from every culture, and every period of human history has as a boundary only the requirement that it make more sense of more data than any other synthesis. Even the initial premises of such a synthesis can be different from what we have previously used to begin our formulation of a picture of reality.

#### Framework: The team with the better epistemological connection to the topic should win

#### Rethinking our epistemologies through revelatory knowledge re-situates ourselves in a moral universe. This relationship infuses our lives with creative and cooperative political and ethical possibilities.

**Cheney in 2k5** (Jim, Professor Emeritus at the University of Wisconsin- Waukesha, *Ethics & the Environment* 10.2 (2005) 101-135, *Truth, Knowledge and the Wild World*)

Indian epistemological style, as depicted by Deloria, is even more radical than I have so far indicated. The principles of epistemological method so far mentioned are at least straightforwardly epistemological. But Deloria goes further. Many statements coming from Indian worlds which non-Indians would understand to be statements of belief concerning Indian world views are best understood as principles of epistemological method of a rather different sort than those so far mentioned. Consider, for example, Deloria’s portrait of the universe as a moral universe: The real interest of the old Indians was not to discover the abstract structure of physical reality but rather to find the proper road along which, for the duration of a person’s life, individuals were supposed to walk. This colorful image of the road suggests that the universe is a moral universe. That is to say, there is a proper way to live in the universe: There is a content to every action, behavior, and belief. The sum total of our life experiences has a reality. There is a direction to the universe, empirically exemplified in the physical growth cycles of childhood, youth, and old age, with the corresponding responsibility of every entity to enjoy life, fulfill itself, and increase in wisdom and the spiritual development of personality. Nothing has incidental meaning and there are no coincidences. . . . In the moral universe all activities, events, and entities are related, and consequently it does not matter what kind of existence an entity enjoys, for the responsibility is always 123 ETHICS&THE ENVIRONMENT, 10(2) 2005 there for it to participate in the continuing creation of reality. (Deloria 1999a, 46) These attributes of the moral universe have the same status as the three epistemological principles discussed above. That is, in relationship to the goal of finding the proper road upon which to walk, Indians paint a portrait of a moral universe that invites its own fulfillment,24 they create a ceremonial world that gives direction to the quest for moral understanding and support for living in accordance with that moral understanding. The characteristics of the moral life are not deduced from, or suggested by, a prior value-neutral account of the structure of the universe or “metaphysics of morals”; rather, once again, “ethics opens the way to knowledge, epistemology is value-driven, not vice versa.” This portrait of a moral universe is not properly understood as a set of false (or at least unproven) beliefs or assumptions. Such a view puts “too much stock in the word ‘philosophy’.” As Deloria’s account shows, in the words of the quotation that stands at the beginning of the present essay, “there are alternative ways of intelligently engaging the world. To construe one’s thinking in terms of belief is characteristic of a particular kind of world view” and indigenous peoples do not seem to “conceive of experience in such an overtly intellectualized manner.” Ceremonial worlds do not interfere with, or contradict the projects of Western science, though they arguably provide a better understanding of human existence in the natural world than does Western science, for they place communication and reciprocity with natural environments, rather than the desire to dominate those environments, at the very heart of the production of knowledge. Indian thought on the notion that the universe is alive is truly remarkable. “It cannot be argued,” Deloria says, “that the universe is moral or has a moral purpose without simultaneously maintaining that the universe is alive. The old Indians had no problem with this concept because they experienced life in everything, and there was no reason to suppose that the continuum of life was not universal” (49). Is this a scientific claim with supporting experiential evidence? A metaphysical world view? Not likely in view of our discussion to this point. But Indian thinking concerning what they think of as a living planet is more revealing yet: The practical criterion that is always cited to demonstrate its validity is the easily observable fact that the earth nurtures smaller forms of 124 JIM CHENEY TRUTH, KNOWLEDGE AND THE WILD WORLD life—people, plants, birds, animals, rivers, valleys, and continents. For Indians, both speculation and analogy end at this point. To go further and attribute a plenitude of familiar human characteristics to the earth is unwarranted. It would cast the planet in the restricted clothing of lesser beings, and we would not be able to gain insights and knowledge about the real essence of the earth. (49–50) If speculation and analogy end where Indians end it, then the idea of the living earth isn’t even speculative: it is obvious on the face of it. Not that it can’t be denied, but at that point speculation, theory construction, or metaphysics is necessary. The last sentence in the quotation puts another twist on the matter: It folds the idea of the living earth into a ceremonial world orienting Indians on the moral road. The notion of a living world is not part of an Indian world view, it is an everyday observation fitted into a ceremonial world in a way that enhances its epistemological effectiveness. 25 That is, by casting humans as lesser beings in relation to the living ¶ earth, we more effectively “gain insights and knowledge about the real essence of the earth”: “Coming last, human beings were the ‘younger brothers’ of the other life-forms and therefore had to learn everything from these creatures. Thus human activities resembled bird and animal behavior in many ways and brought the unity of conscious life to an objective focus” (50). The notion of a living universe, therefore, is not merely obvious on the face of it, but it also provides epistemological direction in the search for knowledge (as just stated) as well as powerful moral direction. The epistemological direction is itself ethically informed, as we have seen. There is more: The living universe requires mutual respect among its members, and this suggests that a strong sense of individual identity and self is a dominant characteristic of the world as we know it. The willingness of entities to allow others to fulfill themselves, and the refusal of any entity to intrude thoughtlessly on another, must be the operative principle of this universe. Consequently, self-knowledge and self-discipline are high values of behavior. . . . Respect . . . involves two attitudes. One attitude is the acceptance of self-discipline by humans and their communities to act responsibly toward other forms of life. The other attitude is to seek to establish communications and covenants with other forms of life on a mutually agreeable basis. (50–51) These conclusions aren’t forced upon us by the notion of a living uni- 125 verse, of course, but they are the sorts of conclusions one might expect within a ceremonial world built around the moral purpose of “finding the proper moral and ethical road upon which human beings should walk.” They extend in quite natural ways (1) the general attitude of universal consideration discussed earlier as a feature of Indian worlds as well as (2) our earlier reflections on the geo/biological world as seen through the lenses of Meeker’s notion of the “comedy of survival” and Birch’s thought that “wilderness treats me like a human being.” The central value that informs Deloria’s principles of epistemological method is that of “adaptive fit”—finding the proper road upon which human beings should walk—rather than the values of domination and control. Oriented to the natural world by a set of what non-Indians would think of as beliefs about the world but which are better understood as a set of epistemological guidelines, those who adopt these guidelines become remarkably attuned to what the world tells them about human adaptive fit in the larger more-than-human land community. Just as the land community is the source of human existence and the knowledge encoded in the human body, so it continues to play the central role in the production of knowledge. Knowledge shaped by indigenous principles of epistemological method guarantee that knowledge is the result of deep and continuous communication between person and natural world. Epistemologies shaped by values of domination and control of nature virtually guarantee that the resulting “knowledge”—certainly not wisdom—is a human monologue that structures its understanding of the world around human order and purpose. The world is not permitted to speak on its own behalf. It merely answers questions posed by human culture and answers these questions, not in its own voice, but in a vocabulary, and according to an agenda, not its own. In Francis Bacon’s graphic imagery, nature is put on the rack and forced to confess. Indian epistemology, by contrast, is marked by respect. To repeat: Respect . . . involves two attitudes. One attitude is the acceptance of self-discipline by humans and their communities to act responsibly toward other forms of life. The other attitude is to seek to establish communications and covenants with other forms of life on a mutually agreeable basis. 126 ETHICS&THE ENVIRONMENT, 10(2) 2005 JIM CHENEY TRUTH, KNOWLEDGE AND THE WILD WORLD V In this concluding section I sketch in summary fashion two fundamentally different understandings of the relevance of natural environments to the production of knowledge. I have suggested that indigenous knowledge is based on an epistemology of respect woven within ceremonial worlds designed to accommodate human culture within (and as) a wild world. Western knowledge, on the other hand, is largely designed to bend or assimilate wild systems to cultural order and purpose. It therefore employs epistemologies of domination and control. In this difference we find very different understandings of the relevance of natural environments to the production of knowledge. Or, more precisely put, we find very different understandings of the relevance of our epistemological orientation within the natural world to the emergence of knowledge. Lack of basic trust in the earth matrix as the fundamental sustaining matrix of human life and meaning tends to foster a need to control natural environments for human purposes. This need to control, in turn, generates epistemologies of domination and control. This development tends to be tied to a conception of nonhuman nature as less-than-human, to the objectification of nature, and to the location of meaning and value within the human or in the purposes of a transcendent deity. In such a world, an objective, value-neutral conception of truth seems all but inevitable. Epistemologies of domination and control tend to emphasize knowledge of the world that figures in practices of control and manipulation, and true descriptions of the world are understood as those which describe the world in value-free terms and make the world available for manipulation. Basic trust in the earth matrix as the fundamental sustaining matrix of human life and meaning, on the other hand, lends itself to a complex epistemology that, with its clear-eyed attentiveness to the nonhuman world, is enormously practical, serving the end of survival well. Since “survival” encompasses the notion of “seeking life,” we can also say that this epistemology of respect seeks life: It brings into being an understanding of the world in which the meaning of life is embedded in the natural world. Understanding of the natural world is mythically contoured in a way that is epistemologically sound, opening up, as it does, the possibilities of reciprocity and communication with the nonhuman world. These 127 ETHICS&THE ENVIRONMENT, 10(2) 2005 mythical contours also serve to delineate the proper road along which to walk. Meaning is embedded in things, events, and processes. Attentiveness is more inclusive and encompassing. Responsible truth is the operative concept of truth. Western understandings of the natural world are mythically contoured as ¶ well, of course, but these mythical contours are buried as “subtexts” of science and culture, creating the illusion that the world is as we describe it. Of late, certainly, it has become widely understood that human projects are “inscribed” in our understanding of the world, leading some postmodernists to argue that “it’s words all the way down,” words shaped by human projects. The odd result of the attempt to excise myth from the Western project of understanding the world is that we have, largely, a fragmented cluster of technological understandings of bits of the world filtered through the epistemological lens of manipulation and control. Such knowledge is parochial indeed. Indian worlds, on the other hand, exemplify an epistemology that leads into deeper and deeper, more and more inclusive, communication and reciprocity with the nonhuman world. The world of American Indians Deloria describes is not human centered but Other centered. This world is less parochial because it is Other centered. This knowledge does not step outside the human “form of life,” as no human knowledge can, and, to that extent, exhibits the inescapable parochialism of our biological existence as the animal species we are. Nor, of course, does it step outside its own particular form of historical-cultural situatedness. But, in being Other centered in virtue of the epistemological principles it exemplifies, this knowledge surely transcends the parochialism of much that passes for knowledge in the West. Indian “principles of epistemological method” together constitute an epistemology of adaptive fit by the way in which they open up modes of reflection on experience and stories: they orient Indians in a world understood as alive (even down to the bedrock), capable of reciprocity and communication; and they constitute the relation between humans and nonhumans (again, even down to the bedrock) as a moral relation. Such an epistemology of adaptive fit is, almost by definition, an epistemology that leads away from the parochialism of Western conceptions of the way in which natural environments figure into the production of knowledge, and toward a more cosmopolitan, 128 JIM CHENEY TRUTH, KNOWLEDGE AND THE WILD WORLD inclusive knowing that acknowledges fundamental moral relationships (covenants) that hold the world together as a moral community.¶

## 2ac

### 2AC Ecological Indian K 2AC

#### Rejecting Native essential identity and connection to the land feeds into colonial myths

**Tripathy 6** [“TOWARDS AN ESSENTIAL NATIVE AMERICAN IDENTITY: A THEORETICAL OVERVIEW”, Tripathy, Jyotirmaya, Associate Professor Humanities and Social Sciences @ Indian Institute of Technology, The Canadian Journal of Native Studies26. 2 (2006): 313-329]

Concepts like essentialism, culture, identity and resistance, have been interrogated in cultural theory in the recent years. Certain paradigm shifts that have entered cultural studies are the notions of essentialism as misnomer, culture as hybrid, identity as contingent and resistance as impossibility. Attempts to deconstruct these issues and their displacement are incompatible with Native American experience and identity. Since discourse and representation cancel difference, their normativity needs to be challenged by Native culture and lived experience. In spite of the postmodern denial and suspicion of cultural essence, the latter has been at the centre of Native politics. Recovery of that purity and past are fundamental to Native American identity.¶ This brings into focus the opposition of essentialism and constructionism. Essentialism believes in a fixed essence and an idea of a pure origin, to which individuals must conform. In contrast, constructionism believes that there is nothing pure and originary, because discourse invariably mediates in the formation of identity. Critics of essentialism argue that as various tribes did not experience life the same way, there is no constant determinant of Native identity. This formulation ignores the fact that all these tribes were colonized and dispossessed, dislocated and subjected to cultural genocide. The denial of an origin and authenticity to the former victims of White history does not fit into the agenda of Native resistance. The refusal to acknowledge Native origin and purity perpetuates the colonial myth of 'a people without history.' Even though there is no standardized Native due to internal heterogeneities, Natives have a collective sense of origins rooted in the land and tribal ways of life.¶ Natives represent the most primordial and immutable state of existence among all ethnic groups in North America. This primodiality defies all discursive models and constructionist approaches. This Native essentialism has survived White discursivity. Rudolfo Anaya says,¶ After long years spent in the realm of imagination and creativity, I came to understand that many of the symbols which welled up from my subconscious were not learned, they were part of my ethos, symbols from the archetypal memory residing in the blood, (in Cochran 83)

#### Those myths rewrite Native American thought as a museum piece that remains in the past – instead, the 1ac treats Native American philosophy as something useful, real, and applicable – we as academics should take it seriously

**Tripathy 6** [“TOWARDS AN ESSENTIAL NATIVE AMERICAN IDENTITY: A THEORETICAL OVERVIEW”, Tripathy, Jyotirmaya, Associate Professor Humanities and Social Sciences @ Indian Institute of Technology, The Canadian Journal of Native Studies26. 2 (2006): 313-329]

Besides inviting Natives to be human beings, Whites either mummify and exoticize the traditional Native or congratulate an assimilated Native for being progressive. The first is directed at confining Natives to their reservations as museum pieces, which would serve as a justification for the civilizational drive. The other is self-congratulation at the success of the civilizing mission. The first Native is greeted for being a cultural custodian ("you are a real Native") and the second for being progressive ("O, you are so different; I wish all were so"). The preference is certainly for the latter, because he is simply acted upon, without any resistance. Elizabeth Ermarth questions this kind of subjectivity when she asks, "What independent or moral life can be expected of a subjectivity controlled by systems into which it is born and over which it has little control?" (Ermarth 410).¶ The all-pervasive discourse cannot afford to encourage resistance. Only the privileged can talk about discursive formation, because anything other than that would be a denial of privilege or an invitation to other possible, often resistant, systems. But there are postcolonial critics like Stuart Hall, who have internalized discursive formation as the norm to the negation of essence. His popularization of this kind of subjectivity, that is, "Identities are constructed within, not outside, discourse" (Hall 4), is incompatible with Native resistance. A White man is born into a system that claims to be universal and where one has no knowledge of any alternate system. The ideas of 'route' and identity in process are pre-conceived plans to separate the past from the present, alienate Natives from their roots. By subjecting Natives to the play of dominant systems, Whites deny the development of a discourse that might pose a challenge to their authority. Natives are enticed to become social dupes of the dominant culture, erasing every possibility of agency.

#### There is strength in numbers – using the essential starting point of Native American identity rather than dividing tribes into individual cells allows tribes to better resist white assimilation and give their ideas and philosophy the respect that academia and the alt denies them

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These questions bring into focus the concept of strategic essentialism, a concept popularized by Spivak. This essentialism can be used strategically "not as descriptions of the way things are, but as something that one must adopt to produce a critique of anything" (Spivak 51). Natives and Native authors revision Native myths and rituals to rupture White normativity. Even though some aspects of essentialism cannot be established biologically, they can be retained as strategies to resist the universalizing White American culture. This essentialism is a strategy for resistance, and has to do with retaining Native culture than about blood.¶ Seen from another perspective, the conflict between essentialism and constructionism vanishes. Discovering an identity and constructing an identity, being and becoming, are one and the same thing. Native identity is about commonality and about positioning oneself strategically to be one with the story of origin. The collective memory of Natives and their sense of loss do not allow us to treat them as two different ways of conceiving identity. The Natives, segregated in reservations, not only discover, but also construct their identities to find their roots and the originary moment. Here constructionism is not the negation of the essence, but a route to roots. Five hundred years of subjugation are not enough to erase the sense of roots from the memory of a people whose history is 2,500 years old. Forgetting of roots could have served the colonial purpose since lapses of memory are vital to colonialism. Paula Alien tells us that "the roots of oppression are to be found in the loss of tradition and memory because that loss is always accompanied by a loss of a positive sense of self (Alien 210). Natives, who have a sense of that unalienated life, construct their identity to be one with their roots. Momaday's protagonist Abel and Silko's Tayo are shown to be in search of their roots. Such characters do not see an opposition between essentialism and constructionism. It is their unification with the past that shapes the present. The isolated individual becomes a thorough Native. One constructs one's identity and that construction comes to a close when one finds it in one's tradition. This happens in the cases of Tayo and Slash, the protagonists of Ceremony and Slash. Not biological insiderism but a strategic insiderism can close its doors to the external power. The recognition of this location is a refusal to be absorbed and assimilated. One does not inherit this location, but discovers it. This communal identity is allied with sameness and unity, which have been dismissed in postmodern theory. Much of postmodern theory has developed cultural models based on the linguistic system that amounts to a kind of semiotic imperialism. Constructing an identity based on difference, in contrast to the Native construction of identity based on Native sameness, is another facet of Western individualism. ¶ Constructionism used by cultural studies today and in Native experience must be distinguished. Cultural constructionism or discursive formation of identity is an unconscious internalization of dominant codes, which cancels Native agency and resistance. The individual gives in to the play of dominant practices. But, as far as Native experience is concerned, Natives consciously come to be one with their roots, which gives Natives the power of agency and choice.

#### Assimilation outweighs and turns the critique – institutionalizes white supremacy and destroys Native identity

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The settler mentality threatens Natives either to assimilate or to get lost. This springs from the belief of the White culture as the norm. This is based on the neutrality and justifiability of European culture and the inherent inferiority of Native cultures. Getting assimilated and becoming hybrid shows not only the fragility of Native cultures, but also the acceptance of colonialism as a welcome relief. Thorough acculturation is also an acceptance of Natives' anteriority and primitivism that can justify the colonial mission.¶ Confining identity to representation is an unambiguous game of power universalizing and normativizing dominant practices. But, in spite of its ubiquity, representation is not unresistible. Representation conceals the fact that things do exist in an unmediated reality prior to representation. For Whites, authentic meaning or purity does not exist, unless filtered through White ways. But nativism tries to capture that moment before mediation and resists its Western representations. However Ashcroft, like Hall, Bhabha and other champions of constructionism, refuses to accept any meaning in its unmediated reality when he says, "culture is practised, culture is used, culture is made" (Ashcroft 2). Perpetual oscillation in time and within representation constitutes culture for Ashcroft. It is indeed the White man's privilege to renew culture till it becomes indistinguishable from the White culture. This faith in cultural constructionism with a total negation of purity is a confirmation of the omnipotence of discourse and representation.¶ 'Other' identities are tempted to relinquish their difference through myriads of ways, which sound progressive and humanist. Natives are asked to relinquish tribal loyalties and invited to be a part of the mainstream, where differences must be forgotten to create an order based on equality. This is another strategy employed by the dominant discourse to reduce, even nullify, particularisms and produce a homogeneous humanity. Jeannette Armstrong mocks at this make-believe of living together for a common cause. This idea of a common cause or "we are one people" theory is an attempt to keep the past buried lest it should unsettle present ideas of equality. Slash, the protagonist of the novel of the same name, critiques the American President's speech about a "Great Society."¶ He talked about "progress without strife and change without hatred." At the same time he also said to "reject any among us who seek to reopen old wounds and rekindle hatreds".... I knew he talked about the blacks or any people that upset the fake idea about a "Great Society".... How it was all like that, a fake, while really White people wished we would all either be just like them or stay out of sight. (Armstrong 36)¶ A defense mechanism to hide White injustice to Natives, rather than a common cause, guides the President to develop a Great Society. Natives are given two options, assimilate or get lost. Slash knows that the offer is an attempt to obliterate the difference between Natives and Whites. Natives are good as long as they subscribe to the idea of a Great Society. Going back in time and reopening old wounds would ensure Natives' savagery.¶ The invitation to 'savages' to be human beings is a well planned strategy to conceal what Whites did to others. It means that Whites do not want to hear and respect an alternative and resistant story. But Native literature is replete with resistant stories. This is how Silko defends the implication of stories.¶ They are not just entertainment¶ Don't be fooled.¶ They are all we have, you see¶ all we have to fight off¶ illness and death. (Silko 2)¶ These alternative stories have ethnic and racial implications, which contest White stories of Natives.¶ White institutions establish orders of truth and propriety. In racially motivated White discourse, Natives are made to believe and internalize what is shown to them. Slash reacts to the stereotypical portrayal of Natives in Hollywood movies that confirms the myth of Indian savagery.¶ Worse to watch the mock Indian raids they staged where a whole group of "helpless" wagon trainers would be burned and scalped. I wondered why they did not show things that really happened. (Armstrong 118)¶ Slash here exposes the way truth is made to bear ideological burdens. Discourse is a chain of representations in which statements ideologically conducive to Whites are presented as facts. Discursive identity is a participation in the White-authored discourse. To resist that discourse, Arif Dirlik believes, there is a need to maintain "a social and cultural identity against the depredations of power" (Dirlik 11). Native identity rejects the notion of White cultural normativity, questions the making of discourse and, instead, proposes a strategic ethnic identity based on structures of attachment and solidarity.

### 2AC Framework

#### Thanks, but no thanks, for your “curriculum” and “lesson plans” – the neg’s framework argument is an assimilationist model of pedagogy that mirrors Native American boarding schools – prefer red pedagogy

**Crum 6** [Crum, Steven, "Review of Red Pedagogy: Native American Social and Political Thought By Sandy Grande" (2006). Great Plains Research:A Journal of Natural and Social Sciences. Paper 809.¶ <http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/greatplainsresearch/809>]

In this intriguing book, written by an indigenous ¶ Quechua scholar whose ancestors come from Peru, Sandy ¶ Grande introduces a new term which she labels "Red ¶ Pedagogy." The term has more than one facet. ¶ One element of Red Pedagogy is its insistence that Native Americans in general, including indigenous scholars, ¶ and non-Natives need to critique, challenge, and even ¶ reject dominant modes of thought that have been applied ¶ to indigenous populations for years. Grande provides sol id ¶ evidence that some Native scholars are currently challenging older paradigms. For example, Taiaiake Alfred, ¶ a Mohawk political scientist, questions the modern-day ¶ usage and practice of "sovereignty" that includes voting ¶ politics. According to Alfred, Native Americans should ¶ return to indigenous forms of sovereignty, including tribal ¶ consensus of opinion rather than Euro-American voting. ¶ Another facet of Red Pedagogy is its directive that ¶ once Native Americans emancipate themselves from the ¶ old notions, they need to fill the void by creating new ¶ indigenous ones. Some Native scholars, Grande contends, ¶ are already pursuing this venture, offering the example of ¶ Chippewa intellectual Gerald Vizenor who popularized ¶ the term "Survivance." The term specifies that Native ¶ American existence over the centuries has been much ¶ more than just a story of simple survival. Rather, it is ¶ an account of survivance which, according to Grande, ¶ includes "the active recovery, reimagination, and reinvestment of indigenous ways of being." Although providing no ¶ in-depth discussion of this quote, she is without doubt referring to Native American popUlations who have revived ¶ Native art forms, ceremonies, and other aspects of culture ¶ that have been dormant for decades or even centuries due ¶ to Euro-American assimilationist policies. To put the term Red Pedagogy into perspective, the ¶ author provides a discussion of both historical and contemporary dominant modes of thinking that have been ¶ placed upon tribal people, many of them reflected in U.S. ¶ government policies over the last two centuries. She discusses how the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) "de-Indianized" thousands of young Indian children by removing ¶ them from their families and placing them in federally-operated boarding schools. She discusses the BIA's ¶ essentialist mode of imputing identity to tribal people, a ¶ mode based on biological determination. Not to ignore ¶ how Euro-American women treated Native Americans, ¶ the author also discusses white women reformers and antimodern feminists of the late 19th and early 20th centuries ¶ who, viewing Indians as "free" and "wild," favored assimilationist measures. By doing so, white women helped ¶ reinforce dominant modes applied to Native Americans.

#### Reject the false neutrality of their interpretation – just as the resolution is not mutually agreed upon, but rather crafted behind closed doors in committees that K teams aren’t invited to, the aim to instill political neutrality in pedagogy is a neoconservative tactic to protect white supremacy

**Ward 11** [FEBRUARY 6, 2011, “Critical Pedagogy: Where Are We Now?” - A Book Review, CRITICAL PEDAGOGY: WHERE ARE WE NOW?, Tony Ward is Professor and Head of School at the School of Psychology, Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand, 40 years of education experience]

Instead, what he sees is that critical pedagogy has, to a large extent been “domesticated” that stresses engaging student histories and experiences, that valorise cultural difference but leaves untouched a critical analysis of the political and economic nature of suffering and exploitation, that fail to reflect on or to address the appalling statistics that mark the subjugation of millions of minority American youth or between issues of identity-formation and its relationship to the ownership of the means of production. This reluctance is seen not as coincidental, but as a direct and fearful response to the current moves by a coalition of Bible-wielding fundamentalists and corporate and political conservatives to suppress critical thought and political theorising in the Academy. Taking his own experience as an example, he points to the attempt by the Right to introduce the Academic Bill of Rights that would effectively make it illegal for teachers from using the classroom to supposedly “propagandise” their views. Taking up the challenge, he argues that the aim of the Neocons to render education politically neutral is not itself a politically neutral act:¶ “Pressuring professors to be silent about politics in their classrooms by threat of legal action is itself an abridgement of academic freedom; it is an attempt to remove politics from the classroom by means of imposing politics … on the education process itself.”¶ In response, her turns to the writings and theories of Freire, whom he suggests has been accepted into academia an emasculated form. His mission is to resuscitate Freire and his penetrating Marxist-Humanism and to offer, via Freire’s theories a mission and strategy of hope. For examples, he turns his attention to the model provided by the transformations under way in Venezuela under Hugo Chavez, showing the linkage between education, social conditions and a Marxist Humanism that takes seriously the issue of a socialist future which moves beyond outmoded versions of socialism involving state-ownership.

#### Our interpretation’s embrace of Red Pedagogy solves best – it solves their dialogue and education arguments while avoiding the fake-neutral boarding school their paternalist lesson plan

**Ward 11** [FEBRUARY 6, 2011, “Critical Pedagogy: Where Are We Now?” - A Book Review, CRITICAL PEDAGOGY: WHERE ARE WE NOW?, Tony Ward is Professor and Head of School at the School of Psychology, Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand, 40 years of education experience]

She notes that there is a great deal of correspondence between these principles and the needs and aspirations of indigenous students and teachers. In addition, for indigenous scholars, there is an imperative that such a pedagogy must be unashamedly political, and anti-colonial, creating the conditions for community building and spiritual solidarity. Having said this, Grande cautions that tensions still remain for indigenous scholars, since key operative concepts like democracy, identity, subjectivity, citizenship are still defined in western (colonial) epistemological terms. Having said this, she notes that a red pedagogy will remain unique and distinctive, with a decentred capitalism replaced by the problematic of colonialism. “profoundly multidimensional and intersectional; underwritten by Christian fundamentalism, defined by White supremacy and fuelled by global capitalism”. She builds on this colonialist theme and focuses it on the school as a site of violence, pointing g out that:¶ “In the end all students sense the fundamental contradictions of conquest. How is it possible for democracy to grow from the seeds of tyranny? For the good life can be built upon the deaths of thousands? They rage against the machine, searching for answers, and when they don’t get them they submit to the anaesthetising accoutrements of capital.”¶ It is here that she begins her interrogation of Red lake, pointing out that commentators and analysts continually fail back on models of individualised deviance in their explanations, in aversion to any thought that these horrific incidents might be pervasive or endemic to society at large. Taking up the critical theorist position that asserts profound alienation as a major causative factor, Alienation (from Freire) is here taken to mean “the negation of subjectivity… the separation of the subject from their ontological vocation of active human participation in the world.” This, she asserts, is precisely the conditions existing for the unfortunate 16 year old Ojibwe youth who, finding no other outlet for his colonised existence and rebellion gunned down his grandfather and eight other people. She then unpack the colonised history of the Red Lake Ojibwe community to situate the dreadful occurrence of 2005.¶ There is not room here to detail Grande’s analysis of the internal cultural politics of the Red Lake community. Save to say that the ongoing destruction and erasure of indigenous culture through Christianisation, the replacement of indigenous cultural, family structures with patriarchal structures related to private property, the destruction of extended-family structures through forced education at remote boarding schools, the theft and alienation of land over two centuries through racist legislation and through the imposition of private property structures, The attempted imposition of an Allotment system that individualised and reduced ownership, the setting up of intra-tribal antagonisms through the introduction of blood-quantum, the introduction of Termination (the termination of Indian identity determined by blood quantum to reduce the budget of the BIA) all had a major deleterious impact upon the community, upon its sense of identity and upon the ability of the youth to imagine a future role for themselves in putting right the circumstances created by this history. The history of the Red lake Ojibwe is a history common to colonised indigenous peoples the world over – America, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, South Africa, Zimbabwe etc. The irony is that the Red lake Ojibwe community was legendary in its ability to resist these colonising impositions and had survived better than most tribes. How was it then, that it was the Red lake community through which the effects of these impositions were finally expressed? The answer is clear:¶ “ While Red Lake was strong enough to resist Allotment what they are left with is “common land”, held in trust by the US Government, which doesn’t have the same (or any) value in the eyes of lending institutions (ie. Collateral). This condition leaves individual tribal members little access to capital and therefore wholly dependent on Federal subsidies. Such dependency, compounded over 200 years of whitestream domination, has left tribal peoples exhausted, dispirited, miseducated and therefore vulnerable to the modes and desires of the “outside” world. Those stripped of the benefits of their traditional ways – language, stories, cultural knowledge, memories – have few resources to resist the current onslaught of slogans, jingles and signs that assert the (White) supremacy of everything they are not and don’t have.. Thus, while the vast “commonly held” lands that once protected the Ojibwes from White encroachment and against cultural invasion, the 20th Century influx of satellite television, cell phones, the Internet and other accoutrements of spectacle capitalism has rendered the community isolated but not insulated.. .Hence the legacy of colonisation is felt most acutely among Indian youth, caught at the crossroads of colonialism in this supposedly postcolonial time. Consider that one out of six American Indian teens attempt suicide, 54% o0f American Indian youth live below the poverty line, and 70% of American Indian children in Minnesota live with a single parent or other relative.”¶ Faced with this overwhelming history and reality and the clear and obvious conclusion that colonialism is the root cause, Grande asks the fundamental question for indigenous scholars. Is it possible for them to embrace western critical theory without also entering some Faustian contract that will ultimately reproduce and advance the very circumstances they are fighting. Is it possible to use the Master’s tools to dismantle the Master’s house? Or, “Is it possible to engage the grammar of empire without replicating its effects?” She concludes once again that there is a third way – Red Pedagogy, operating at the crossroads of indigenous knowledge and critical pedagogy, challenging the ways in which critical concepts are themselves the products of colonialism and White supremacy, but at the same time seeking dialogue and mutuality of transformative effect. She suggests that indigenous sovereignty must in these circumstances be viewed not as a separatist issue, but as a restorative process – a move towards restoring the dignity and capacity for self-determined subjectivity that once was, directed by the people themselves and supported by the State.

#### Their framework is extratopical—resolved means to personally think about things—fiat is extratopical and allows affs to claim absurd solvency arguments

**AHD 2k6.** American Heritage Dictionary

resolved v. To cause (a person) to reach a decision.

#### We are the USFG

**Raney 10** [Gary Raney – Ada County Sherriff, “ Ada County Sheriff Gary Raney Response to Inquiry regarding Oathkeepers”, October 25th, 2010, <http://wearechangeidaho.org/CategoryArticles.php?id=1>]

First premise: “They” – the federal government – are not a distant body beyond our control. We are a republic and **we are the federal government** by the power of our vote. It is disingenuous for people to talk about the government as something foreign, like an enemy. In my opinion, it is our general apathy as voters that, by an omission of a vote

#### And, the spirit vision of Alex Lunderman is a topical one: we’ll defend wind energy

#### We have definitional support – we came to this round prepared to debate about the various ways in which the resolution has been revealed to us – their interpretation is an arbitrary preference for policymaking – teams can argue heg good on the aff and neg, and they never have to stray away from defending policymaking – they think a certain set of literature has hegemonic authority because they and the people they know follow it

#### The neg framework has no claim to their form of debate except history and tradition. Switch side debate is a drive to force a form of traditional interpretation along a singular coherent form of communication is inherently silencing to other perspectives.

**Secomb 2000** (Linnell, a lecturer in Gender Studies at the University of Sydney, "Fractured Community" Hypatia-Volume 15, Number 2, Spring 2000, pp.138-139)]-AC

This reformulated universalist model of community would be founded on "a moral conversation in which the capacity to reverse perspectives, that is, the willingness to reason from the others' point of view, and the sensitivity to hear their voice is paramount" (1992, 8). Benhabib argues that this model does not assume that consensus can be reached but that a "reasonable agreement" can be achieved. This formulation of community on the basis of a conversation in which perspectives can be reversed, also implies a new understanding of identity and alterity. Instead of the generalized other, Benhabib argues that ethics, politics, and community must engage with the concrete or particular other. A theory that only engages with the generalized other sees the other as a replica of the self. In order to overcome this reductive assimilation of alterity, Benhabib formulates a universalist community which recognizes the concrete other and which allows us to view others as unique individuals (1992, 10). Benhabib's critique of universalist liberal theory and her formulation of an alternative conversational model of community are useful and illuminating. However, I suggest that her vision still assumes the desirability of commonality and agreement, which, I argue, ultimately destroy difference. Her vision of a community of conversing alterities assumes sufficient similarity between alterities [End Page 138] so that each can adopt the point of view of the other and, through this means, reach a "reasonable agreement." She assumes the necessity of a common goal for the community that would be the outcome of the "reasonable agreement." Benhabib's community, then, while attempting to enable difference and diversity, continues to assume a commonality of purpose within community and implies a subjectivity that would ultimately collapse back into sameness. Moreover, Benhabib's formulation of community, while rejecting the fantasy of consensus, nevertheless privileges communication, conversation, and agreement. This privileging of communication assumes that all can participate in the rational conversation irrespective of difference. Yet this assumes rational interlocutors, and rationality has tended, both in theory and practice, to exclude many groups and individuals, including: women, who are deemed emotional and corporeal rather than rational; non-liberal cultures and individuals who are seen as intolerant and irrational; and minoritarian groups who do not adopt the authoritative discourses necessary for rational exchanges. In addition, this ideal of communication fails to acknowledge the indeterminacy and multiplicity of meaning in all speech and writing. It assumes a singular, coherent, and transparent content. Yet, as Gayatri Spivak writes: "the verbal text is constituted by concealment as much as revelation. . . . [T]he concealment is itself a revelation and visa versa" (Spivak 1976, xlvi). For Spivak, Jacques Derrida, and other deconstructionists, all communication involves contradiction, inconsistency, and heterogeneity. Derrida's concept of *différance* indicates the inevitable deferral and displacement of any final coherent meaning. The apparently rigorous and irreducible oppositions that structure language, Derrida contends, are a fiction. These mutually exclusive dichotomies turn out to be interrelated and interdependent: their meanings and associations, multiple and ambiguous (Derrida 1973, 1976). While Benhabib's objective is clearly to allow all groups within a community to participate in this rational conversation, her formulation fails to recognize either that language is as much structured by miscommunication as by communication, or that many groups are silenced or speak in different discourses that are unintelligible to the majority. Minority groups and discourses are frequently ignored or excluded from political discussion and decision-making because they do not adopt the dominant modes of authoritative and rational conversation that assume homogeneity and transparency.

**ELLIS IN 2004** (ANDY, DEBATE CRITIC AND COACH AT TOWSON U, MESSAGE POSTED TO EDEBATE, ARCHIVED AT HTTP://WWW.NDTCEDA.COM/ARCHIVES/200404/0463.HTML)

3)Lets make this argument perfectly clear too, its not just ok to be like i wanna work on the hill or i wanna work in the washington think tank establishment any more than its ok to be all like well i dont like the third reich but that internship a the chancelors asitant is a good carreer move, people wont say this because we are all supposed to be civil in this activity but what many of the community members use debate as preperation for is preperation for a kind of thinking that has left millions of dead bodies scattered here and around the world. When people say well i do this because i wanna be a congressman so i have to have traditional debate so i can prepare i say see you dont know how right you are, my experience with much actual policy making is that it is a lot like traditional deate, decisons made in a hermeticly sealed insular context free from public participation and input in which the bodies of those most effected by the decsion are wielded entirely out of their control, decisons are always played out ona gameboard and made in a calculative way, much like debates most of the real policymaking is made by privilaged white males in closed door settings, much like traditional debate a discourse of expertise is utilized to exclude anybody who doesnt know the language, so yes debate is preaprtion for the policy making process, but instead of a reason why to keep going its a reason to take action to intervene against the genocidal condensation that exists within the preperatory pedagigy that jake and a bunch of other people simply find fun...lots of people like bull fighting too, doesnt mean that your fun is free of complicty in bad shit 4)before you tel me about all the good policy makers who have come out of debate that would have otherwise been eviler genocidal fucks, consider the massive amounts of lawyers and policymakers who we have taught to be better genocideres, those folks who will now be better prosecutors better imperial planners, better able to add liberal legitimacy to the pnac empire machine,simply put i dont doubt that many of you are prearing for a future in politics, my problem is with the way you prepare and what you are preapring for.

### AT: Agonism

#### Our practice of dissent is net more agonistic than their imposition of a narrow agenda for debate---you don’t teach democracy, you practice it---boom

**Norval 12 –** University of Essex—Government

(Alleta, “''Don't Talk Back!''−−The Subjective Conditions of Critical Public Debate”, Political Theory December 2012 vol. 40 no. 6 802-810, dml)

While Habermas’s sentiments clearly mirror the disdain for mass culture ¶ found generally in the writings of other critical theorists, one has to reflect ¶ on whether they are also a sign of what Macpherson long ago has called “the ¶ liberal fear of the masses.” This is echoed in Simone Chambers’s recently ¶ articulated question as to whether deliberative democracy has abandoned ¶ mass democracy?¶ 26¶ Mass publics, she argues, seem to have been abandoned ¶ in favour of **carefully constructed mini-publics**, in which **controlled critical** ¶ reasoning (**deliberation**) **can take place**.¶ 27¶ Chambers links this question, as it ¶ should be, to the deep mistrust of rhetoric, and its associations with the ¶ masses and the “wasteland of nondeliberative politics.” However, even ¶ though Chambers raises this important question, the sentiments so clearly ¶ expressed in Habermas are re-affirmed through the introduction of another ¶ dichotomy: the distinction between deliberative rhetoric and plebiscitory ¶ rhetoric, which suffers from all the pathologies Habermas attributed to mass ¶ publics. As in Habermas, Chambers touches upon the importance of the ¶ question of how “citizens form their opinions,” arguing that it is “an integral ¶ part of a theory of deliberative democracy.”¶ 28¶ To think about the how is not ¶ a matter of multiplying mini-publics, but of fostering the promotion and ¶ proliferation of a multiplicity of citizen–citizen encounters. Such “face-toface encounters of everyday talk” could promote “the skills needed to be a ¶ critical yet receptive audience.”¶ 29¶ Could the uses of the social media with which I started this short piece be ¶ considered cases of such interaction, if not face-to-face then in peer-to-peer ¶ networks and engagements between citizens and the state mediated via the ¶ new media? I would argue that, indeed, they could and ought to be treated as ¶ such. However, for this to become possible, and to be able to note the democratic potential of such interactions, the fundamentally dichotomous thinking ¶ that inspires both Habermas’s text and deliberative accounts of democracy ¶ more generally, must be abandoned, for it is part of the problem. As Habermas ¶ notes with respect to Räsonnement, the nuances of both sides are preserved¶ in the term. The same holds here: publics are both capable of being critical ¶ and of being manipulated; it is not the case that the virtue of the critical use ¶ of reason belongs to a particular sociological group or form of society. Democratic subjectivity is cultivated through **participation in practices of** ¶ “**talking back**.” It may include the education to which Habermas refers, but it ¶ also depends upon embodied practices of habituation,¶ 30¶ upon political imagination and upon the operation of exemplars, and upon actions that manifest ¶ for us other possibilities of being and acting.¶ 31¶ The particular forms such “talking back” take is of lesser importance: they ¶ can take a range of forms, **not all of which would** **correspond to a neatly rationalized image of deliberation**.¶ 32¶ But, **that makes them no less valuable**. Of ¶ fundamental importance is the thought that critical abilities are verified in the ¶ articulation of wrongs, as Rancière may put it.¶ 33¶ That is, the ability to act ¶ critically is fostered, enacted, and deepened in the very process of expressing ¶ demands and making claims.¶ 34¶ The fostering of virtues associated with ¶ democracy—**giving voice to senses of wrong and injustice**, protesting, occupying, listening to others, critically debating options, giving and receiving ¶ reasons, coming to see things in a different way through critical engagement ¶ with others, proposing alternatives, aspiring to higher selves and better societies, to name but a few—come about in and through construction of and ¶ **participation in** **critical, oppositional activities**.¶ 35¶ While recognising the limitations of the Internet as discursive space, policy analysts and political theorists experimenting with these new spaces and their potential contribution to ¶ democratic politics are emphasizing the extent to which they contribute to ¶ “the broad objective of **making policy debate** . . . **accessible and meaningful** ¶ and at the same time **agonistically authentic** and equitable.” In particular, it ¶ contributes to the expansion of available narratives that may compel policy ¶ makers to **avoid setting agendas too narrowly**, enabling the promotion of nonhegemonic political alternatives and policy options and facilitating the voicing of views in a wide variety of ways. As Coleman argues, there are virtues ¶ to digital storytelling that fosters and values situated contingency, “acknowledgement of the local and quotidian, and a willingness to embrace existential ¶ ambiguity” in a pluralistic political universe.¶ 36¶ **One becomes a democrat**;¶ 37¶ **one is not taught—from above—to be one**. ¶ Intuition and provocation takes precedence over tuition and instruction.¶ 38¶ The ¶ emphasis Habermas puts on teaching and training in the historical analysis of ¶ The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere is crucial. However, for ¶ these insights to take their proper place in thinking about democracy, they ¶ need to be democratized, opened up to **possibilities that** **cannot be contemplated within** the **structures** of the critical public–mass distinction. If we think ¶ of democracy **in less restrictive terms**, it becomes possible to focus on fostering the development of radical democratic subjectivities, that cannot be anticipated nor held “accountable to any theoretical formulation”; radical democratic utterances both proclaim and enact the coming into being of a democratic ¶ subjectivity.¶ 39¶ This necessary openness only becomes a possibility once one ¶ takes the fundamental abilities and capacities of all, the counted and the ¶ uncounted, seriously. Emerson, like Rancière, suggests that each of us is ¶ capable of developing judgments from a standpoint that “all and sundry” ¶ “may be expected to find in themselves.”¶ 40¶ Emerson is clear about the continuous work on the self that this involves. He is also clear that it involves ¶ aversion to society and to the “herd.”¶ 41¶ Yet, this is never expressed in any ¶ other way than that those aspects of the self and of society that resemble the ¶ “herd”—the “mass” for Habermas—run through each and every one of us. ¶ Aversion to those aspects is crucial, but it is not achieved through external ¶ means, nor is it something associated with or limited to specific groups. “The ¶ virtue most in request [in society] is conformity. Self-reliance is its aversion.”¶ 42¶ Aversion opens the way to activities through which we can foster the ¶ virtues associated with a critical engagement and development of a better self ¶ and society. The perfectionism invoked here is non-elitist and non-teleological: ¶ it is a possibility open to each and all.¶ 43¶ **It does not predetermine and prefigure what is possible**, and along which road we must all travel. To quote ¶ Cavell, “The better world we think . . . is not a world that is gone, hence it is ¶ not to be mourned, but one to be borne, witnessed.”¶ 44¶ We should not mourn ¶ the loss of the bourgeois public sphere, but work on the possibilities opened ¶ up by the world coming into being.

### AT: Cede The Political

#### Infusing the political with proposals by non-instrumental actors actors key to overcome hegemonic ideology construction – moreover, they can’t access policymaking, because the aff skips all of the important steps in policy-making

**Carpentier 2011** (Nico, asst prof comm @  Vrije Universiteit Brussel “Policy’s Hubris: Power, Fantasy, and the Limits of (Global) Media Policy Interventions” The Handbook of Global Media and Communication Policy, First Edition.)

This discussion on the nature of policy brings us to an encounter with a set of key assumptions which will be theorized here as fantasies, using a Lacanian framework.4 The reason for using this framework is that there are implicit claims embedded within policy debates that are partially (discursive) power strategies but, partially also, fantasies about control and harmony. And within a Lacanian framework, fantasy beholds the promise of the unachievable wholeness and the harmonious resolution of social antagonism. Although this access to the Real is impossible, the fantasy, as such, and the desire for wholeness and harmony that lies behind it remain crucial driving forces and feed into the strategies that the diversity of (policy) actors develop. This also implies that these fantasies become part of our social realities in many different ways, for instance, as utopian driving forces for political activity and as discursive strategies for legitimating policies. A first fantasy has already been mentioned in the discussion about the classic perspective on policy. In the introductory part of his discussion of media policy, which carries the title “Is policy political?,” Freedman (2008: 2) refers to the mechanical perspective of policy-making, which marginalizes “political agency in favour of administrative technique and scientific principles” and becomes “the domain of small thoughts, bureaucratic tidiness and administrative effectiveness.” This fantasy of isolating policy from politics (and from the political) is a protective strategy to generate a harmonious and consensual zone within the social, out side political conflicts and antagonisms, which is believed to be governed by bureaucratic principles and/or legalistic mechanisms. This way of thinking is very much related to the ideology of “endism,” which proclaimed the end of ideology and claimed that this would lead to the replacement of politics by a managerial culture (see, for instance, Burnham (1941) and Bell (1960) ). More contemporary critical frameworks refer to (and critique) the post-political and the post-democratic, where the latter is defined by Rancière (2007: 88) as “the rule of the principle of unification of the multitude under the common law of the One.” Not only does this lead to the conflation of the “pays légal” and the “pays reél” (to use the two marvellous French concepts that allow us to distinguish between legislation and social practice), but it also becomes a form of strategic power that allows for the mobilization of actors (and their minds and bodies), discourses, and objects to legitimize the hegemonization of specific political projects by reverting to the claim that these projects are outside the political. However important this fantasy may be, it is structurally frustrated by the permanent reemergence of antagonisms and conflicts. This brings us to Mouffe’s (2005: 9) argument that the political is structurally defined by “power, conflict and antagonism.” Her work challenges the post-political status quo, which assumes that a societal consensus is reached or reachable. Not surprisingly, the last sentence of her 2005 book On the Political is a plea for “abandoning the dream of a reconciled world that would have overcome power, sovereignty and hegemony” (Mouffe 2005: 130; my emphasis). Through the contingency of the social, any hegemony and social imaginary, however phantasmagorically comforting it may be, remains vulnerable to contestation, and even the most sedimented and takenfor-granted certainties can become unfixed and fluid, as they are permanently vulnerable to rearticulation. In Mouffe’s (2005: 18) words: “What is at a given moment considered as the ‘natural’ order – jointly with the ‘common sense’ which accompanies it – is the result of sedimented practices; it is never the manifestation of a deeper objectivity exterior to the practices that bring it into being.”

#### Theory doesn’t kill relevance – need to ask epistemological questions to avoid policy failure – this card will win us the debate

**Reus-Smit 12** – Professor of International Relations at the European University Institute, Florence (Christian, “International Relations, Irrelevant? Don’t Blame Theory”, Millennium - Journal of International Studies June 2012 vol. 40 no. 3 525-540, dml)

However widespread it might be, the notion that IR’s lack of practical relevance stems from excessive theorising rests more on vigorous assertion than weighty evidence. As noted above, we lack good data on the field’s practical relevance, and the difficulties establishing appropriate measures are all too apparent in the fraught attempts by several governments to quantify the impact of the humanities and social sciences more generally. Beyond this, though, we lack any credible evidence that any fluctuations in the field’s relevance are due to more or less high theory. We hear that policymakers complain of not being able to understand or apply much that appears in our leading journals, but it is unclear why we should be any more concerned about this than physicists or economists, who take theory, even high theory, to be the bedrock of advancement in knowledge. Moreover, there is now a wealth of research, inside and outside IR, that shows that policy communities are not open epistemic or cognitive realms, simply awaiting well-communicated, non-jargonistic knowledge – they are bureaucracies, deeply susceptible to groupthink, that filter information through their own intersubjective frames. 10 Beyond this, however, there are good reasons to believe that precisely the reverse of the theory versus relevance thesis might be true; that theoretical inquiry may be a necessary prerequisite for the generation of practically relevant knowledge. I will focus here on the value of metatheory, as this attracts most contemporary criticism and would appear the most difficult of theoretical forms to defend.

Metatheories take other theories as their subject. Indeed, their precepts establish the conditions of possibility for second-order theories. In general, metatheories divide into three broad categories: epistemology, ontology and meta-ethics. The first concerns the nature, validity and acquisition of knowledge; the second, the nature of being (what can be said to exist, how things might be categorised and how they stand in relation to one another); and the third, the nature of right and wrong, what constitutes moral argument, and how moral arguments might be sustained. Second-order theories are constructed within, and on the basis of, assumptions formulated at the metatheoretical level. Epistemological assumptions about what constitutes legitimate knowledge and how it is legitimately acquired delimit the questions we ask and the kinds of information we can enlist in answering them. 11 Can social scientists ask normative questions? Is literature a valid source of social-scientific knowledge? Ontological assumptions about the nature and distinctiveness of the social universe affect not only what we ‘see’ but also how we order what we see; how we relate the material to the ideational, agents to structures, interests to beliefs, and so on. If we assume, for example, that individuals are rational actors, engaged in the efficient pursuit of primarily material interests, then phenomena such as faith-motivated politics will remain at the far periphery of our vision. 12 Lastly, meta-ethical assumptions about the nature of the good, and about what constitutes a valid moral argument, frame how we reason about concrete ethical problems. Both deontology and consequentialism are meta-ethical positions, operationalised, for example, in the differing arguments of Charles Beitz and Peter Singer on global distributive justice. 13

Most scholars would acknowledge the background, structuring role that metatheory plays, but argue that we can take our metatheoretical assumptions off the shelf, get on with the serious business of research and leave explicit metatheoretical reflection and debate to the philosophers. If practical relevance is one of our concerns, however, there are several reasons why this is misguided.

Firstly, whether IR is practically relevant depends, in large measure, on the kinds of questions that animate our research. I am not referring here to the commonly held notion that we should be addressing questions that practitioners want answered. Indeed, our work will at times be most relevant when we pursue questions that policymakers and others would prefer left buried. My point is a different one, which I return to in greater detail below. It is sufficient to note here that being practically relevant involves asking questions of practice; not just retrospective questions about past practices – their nature, sources and consequences – but prospective questions about what human agents should do. As I have argued elsewhere, being practically relevant means asking questions of how we, ourselves, or some other actors (states, policymakers, citizens, NGOs, IOs, etc.) should act. 14 Yet our ability, nay willingness, to ask such questions is determined by the metatheoretical assumptions that structure our research and arguments. This is partly an issue of ontology – what we see affects how we understand the conditions of action, rendering some practices possible or impossible, mandatory or beyond the pale. If, for example, we think that political change is driven by material forces, then we are unlikely to see communicative practices of argument and persuasion as potentially successful sources of change. More than this, though, it is also an issue of epistemology. If we assume that the proper domain of IR as a social science is the acquisition of empirically verifiable knowledge, then we will struggle to comprehend, let alone answer, normative questions of how we should act. We will either reduce ‘ought’ questions to ‘is’ questions, or place them off the agenda altogether. 15 Our metatheoretical assumptions thus determine the macro-orientation of IR towards questions of practice, directly affecting the field’s practical relevance.

Secondly, metatheoretical revolutions license new second-order theoretical and analytical possibilities while foreclosing others, directly affecting those forms of scholarship widely considered most practically relevant. The rise of analytical eclecticism illustrates this. As noted above, Katzenstein and Sil’s call for a pragmatic approach to the study of world politics, one that addresses real-world problematics by combining insights from diverse research traditions, resonates with the mood of much of the field, especially within the American mainstream. Epistemological and ontological debates are widely considered irresolvable dead ends, grand theorising is unfashionable, and gladiatorial contests between rival paradigms appear, increasingly, as unimaginative rituals. Boredom and fatigue are partly responsible for this new mood, but something deeper is at work. Twenty-five years ago, Sil and Katzenstein’s call would have fallen on deaf ears; the neo-neo debate that preoccupied the American mainstream occurred within a metatheoretical consensus, one that combined a neo-positivist epistemology with a rationalist ontology. This singular metatheoretical framework defined the rules of the game; analytical eclecticism was unimaginable. The Third Debate of the 1980s and early 1990s destabilised all of this; not because American IR scholars converted in their droves to critical theory or poststructuralism (far from it), but because metatheoretical absolutism became less and less tenable. The anti-foundationalist critique of the idea that there is any single measure of truth did not produce a wave of relativism, but it did generate a widespread sense that battles on the terrain of epistemology were unwinnable. Similarly, the Third Debate emphasis on identity politics and cultural particularity, which later found expression in constructivism, did not vanquish rationalism. It did, however, establish a more pluralistic, if nevertheless heated, debate about ontology, a terrain on which many scholars felt more comfortable than that of epistemology. One can plausibly argue, therefore, that the metatheoretical struggles of the Third Debate created a space for – even made possible – the rise of analytical eclecticism and its aversion to metatheoretical absolutes, a principal benefit of which is said to be greater practical relevance.

Lastly, most of us would agree that for our research to be practically relevant, it has to be good – it has to be the product of sound inquiry, and our conclusions have to be plausible. The pluralists among us would also agree that different research questions require different methods of inquiry and strategies of argument. Yet across this diversity there are several practices widely recognised as essential to good research. Among these are clarity of purpose, logical coherence, engagement with alternative arguments and the provision of good reasons (empirical evidence, corroborating arguments textual interpretations, etc.). Less often noted, however, is the importance of metatheoretical reflexivity. If our epistemological assumptions affect the questions we ask, then being conscious of these assumptions is necessary to ensure that we are not fencing off questions of importance, and that if we are, we can justify our choices. Likewise, if our ontological assumptions affect how we see the social universe, determining what is in or outside our field of vision, then reflecting on these assumptions can prevent us being blind to things that matter. A similar argument applies to our meta-ethical assumptions. Indeed, if deontology and consequentialism are both meta-ethical positions, as I suggested earlier, then reflecting on our choice of one or other position is part and parcel of weighing rival ethical arguments (on issues as diverse as global poverty and human rights). Finally, our epistemological, ontological and meta-ethical assumptions are not metatheoretical silos; assumptions we make in one have a tendency to shape those we make in another. The oft-heard refrain that ‘if we can’t measure it, it doesn’t matter’ is an unfortunate example of epistemology supervening on ontology, something that metatheoretical reflexivity can help guard against. In sum, like clarity, coherence, consideration of alternative arguments and the provision of good reasons, metatheoretical reflexivity is part of keeping us honest, making it practically relevant despite its abstraction.

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### AT: Wind DA

#### Understandings of wind and wind power are always in flux, coming to terms with this is a necessary first step to changing our relationship with culture and energy

**Bosworth 10** (Kai A Bosworth - B.A.: Environmental Studies, Macalester College, Saint Paul, MN, 1/1/2010. “Straws in the Wind: Race, Nature and Technoscience in Postcolonial South Dakotan Wind Power Development,” http://digitalcommons.macalester.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1007&context=envi\_honors)

The wind cannot exist outside of its relationship to a heterogeneity of other things. We cannot understand what wind is without seeing its play with trees, without feeling it ¶ on our skin, without wind turbines that spin or colorful radar maps. Wind is movement; ¶ for wind to stop, it would no longer be wind. It enters and escapes our understanding through cultural production -- wind resource maps, videos, and whoosh lines in cartoons ¶ accomplish the task. The wind calls up the utter incomprehensibility of object/subject, material/immaterial, and nature/culture. To think about people and things as engaged in windy relationships references the ways in which everything is multiply enacted and engaged through social construction, diverse epistemologies, human and nonhuman practices, and the materiality of nature, bodies, and performance. The windy mess is what ¶ comes to matter – it is what is always coming into being, and what is becoming ¶ important, but it is still impossible to ever fully grasp. To think of the narrative of this thesis as windy, then, is to understand its ontologies as historical and always shifting, formed by relationships to other human and nonhuman things, as always socially constructed, but only partially.

Although a seemingly iterative and redundant process, the wind is made and remade in different ways through power. Different geographies, social relationships, and networks of technologies, humans, and nonhumans produce different winds. The cohesive idea of “the wind” enters narrative structures like history through human ¶ experience and practice, mediated by texts, maps, technologies, and geophysical ¶ landscapes. Human actors or their culture do not simply add meaning and vitality to a nonhuman force called nature. The objects and animals we interact with always constitute what human-ness is, in its various constitutive forms.

The heterogeneous assemblage of wind, wind power, DOE websites, cattle, ¶ policy, tax structures, colonial histories, Lakota people, and transmission lines is not a static or fully determined network. A number of other similar relationships have been formed by indigenous people with systems of wind power, reproducing and rearticulating the Ecological Indian and other discourses of indigeneity, nature, science, and ¶ colonialism.

#### Wind power increasing now

**Bosworth 10** (Kai A Bosworth - B.A.: Environmental Studies, Macalester College, Saint Paul, MN, 1/1/2010. “Straws in the Wind: Race, Nature and Technoscience in Postcolonial South Dakotan Wind Power Development,” http://digitalcommons.macalester.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1007&context=envi\_honors)

The wind power industry has grown immensely over the last ten years, from a ¶ niche market for hobbyists and prototypes to a major part of the US energy portfolio. ¶ Despite the recent economic recession, the amount of new wind power added each year ¶ continues to grow, in part because of federal and state subsidies and financing. The ¶ American Wind Energy Association reported that nearly 10,000 MW of wind energy ¶ were added in 2009, enough to power 2.4 million homes. If each turbine were 1.5 MW (a ¶ standard size), this amounts to about 6,000 turbines (AWEA 2010). Of the almost 35,000 ¶ MW of installed wind capacity now online in the United States, only a handful of ¶ individual turbines and one major wind farm are on Native American land. In the larger ¶ scheme of things, the current status of Native American wind power can seem quite ¶ insignificant. Yet despite many barriers, as wind power development has increased ¶ nationwide, attempts to build wind power on Native American land have also increased.

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### Wind DA

#### Representations of wind power affect how projects are conceived and implemented

**Bosworth 10** (Kai A Bosworth - B.A.: Environmental Studies, Macalester College, Saint Paul, MN, 1/1/2010. “Straws in the Wind: Race, Nature and Technoscience in Postcolonial South Dakotan Wind Power Development,” http://digitalcommons.macalester.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1007&context=envi\_honors)

Representations do not solely create the world. They help produce and manage imaginative geographies of desire, knowledge, and experience. Representations help ¶ frame and form assemblages of race, nature, and technoscience in wind power development projects (see Gregory 2001). They help build alliances and fit new¶ technologies within comfortable narratives of indigeneity, in ways that produce ¶ normative ways of thinking about the possibilities of wind power.

### Counter-Advocacy

#### No companies get involved

**Neiss, 1ac evidence, continues in 02**

The Rosebud Wind Project is something the Tribe started on its own. Now, working with the Department of Energy, we are installing a utility-scale wind turbine on the reservation.  We are also working with the Rural Utility Service for a loan to help pay for the project.